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Valuation of corporate debt has been an extremely important, albeit imprecise 
task in asset pricing. Both structural models and reduced form models have had 
limited success in explaining the corporate yield spreads observed in actual markets. 
Taking advantage of a unique corporate bond dataset from the National Association of 
Securities Dealers, this dissertation investigates whether informed trading takes place 
in the high-yield corporate bond market, and its implications for corporate bond 
pricing. Differing from previous studies, I find that current corporate bond returns 
have explanatory power for future stock price changes. This implies that the corporate 
bond market serve important roles in disseminating new information.  Based on this 
finding, this dissertation also demonstrates that in addition to liquidity, the amount of 
information based trading plays an important role in determining yield spreads of risky 
corporate bonds, which is consistent with the hypothesis that investors require higher 
return to compensate them for bearing the risks of trading with more informed traders. 
In line with a strand of recent literature on the implications of market microstructure 
for asset pricing, this paper suggests that corporate bond yields might embed an 
information risk premium that is ignored by existing bond pricing models. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 INFORMATION-BASED TRADING IN THE JUNK BOND MARKET 
 
Introduction 
Since 1934, when the United States Congress enacted the Securities Exchange 
Act, the stock and the options markets have been under intense scrutiny for potential 
abuse of material nonpublic information.  However, information-based trading also 
seems to be taking place in the corporate bond market, as investigations by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office have 
revealed the occurrence of insider trading and price manipulation in the junk bond1 
market by the “king of junk bonds”— Michael Milken.  In 1989, James Dahl, an 
employee of Milken's junk bond department, swore before a grand jury that Milken 
advised him to buy up Caesar’s World bonds from their own customers on the day 
when Milken made a presentation to Caesar’s World on how to handle their finance, 
i.e., a sales pitch.  In 1990, Michael Milken pleaded guilty to six felony counts in 
connection with insider trading, and he was sentenced by federal Judge Kimba Wood 
to 10 years in prison (though he was released in 1993). 
 
Michael Milken is not the only one who acted inappropriately on private 
information in the once arcane world of high-yield debt market.  Institutional investors 
and investment bankers who trade high-yield corporate bonds every so often 
participate in syndicated loans for the same company issuing high-yield bonds.  Since 
investors who lend to the company are entitled to send representatives to regular 
                                                 
1 A bond rated BB or lower because of its high default risk. Also known as a high-yield bond, or 
speculative bond. 
  2
meetings with the borrowing company’s management and bankers, they obtain access 
to some confidential information, such as updated projections of revenues and 
earnings, or plans for an acquisition or divestiture, which public investors will never 
see.  When such information from internal discussions is improperly leaked or 
misused, prices of the borrowing company’s bonds will be affected and investors 
acting on this private information will make profits.  Indeed, trading based on such 
private information in the credit markets has been warned about in research work 
authored by Chris Dialynas, a managing director and portfolio manager at Pacific 
Investment Management Co., which is one of the world’s top bond investors.  
Furthermore, former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt stated that the SEC has “found 
anecdotal evidence of the possible misuse of inside information in the high-yield 
(debt) market2”. 
 
At a first glance, it is counter-intuitive that investors with private information 
about a company will trade in its debt securities.  Even though the value of a 
company’s debt, equity and its derivatives will all be affected by information related 
to the issuing company’s underlying assets, investors who posses such undisclosed 
information will presumably trade in the equity security and/or its derivatives, rather 
than in the debt securities.  According to a recent study released by the SEC [Edwards, 
Harris and Piwowar (2004)], average transaction costs for trades in corporate bonds 
are higher than in stocks. Furthermore, unlike options, corporate bonds do not provide 
higher leverage than stocks. If trading corporate bonds incurs higher transaction costs 
but offers lower leverage, why would an informed investor trade in the corporate bond 
market? 
                                                 
2 See speech by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt: “The Importance of Transparency in America’s Debt 
Market”, at the Media Studies Center, New York, N.Y., on September 9th, 1998. 
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Several explanations stand out when we look into the transaction costs 
argument and the market structure for high-yield corporate bonds.  First of all, as it has 
been documented in several previous studies, the value of high-yield corporate debt is 
very sensitive to firm-specific information, especially extreme information regarding 
the state of the company.  Therefore, the high-yield corporate bond market offers 
potential profitable opportunities for trading on nonpublic information.  More 
importantly, these opportunities provide an additional venue for an informed trader to 
strategically exploit his private information.  Conventionally, an informed trader 
employs optimal trading strategies in the stock and the options markets to make the 
most out of his information.  These trading strategies typically include certain trading 
intensity over multiple trading periods, as well as an optimal order size for each 
individual period [see for example, Kyle (1984, 1985), Foster and Viswannathan 
(1993) and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)].  Conceivably, trading too 
aggressively on the private information in stocks and options makes it harder for the 
informed trader to hide from the marker maker and the regulators, and hence increases 
his transaction costs. As the informed trader becomes more aggressive, trading in 
stocks and options gets more and more expensive.  At some point, the marginal cost 
from trading an additional amount of stocks and options exceed that for a first trade in 
high-yield bonds. As a result, substituting a certain amount of excess trading in stocks 
and options with a trade in the issuer’s high-yield debt might better serve the informed 
trader’s goal in maximizing his total profits.  Furthermore, given the fact that the debt 
securities market has been subject to much less scrutiny for insider trading compared 
to the markets for equity securities and derivative securities, informed traders have 
much lower perceived probability of being detected and prosecuted.  Datta and Datta 
argue that “the absence of any reporting requirement for insider bond transactions may 
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create an enhanced opportunity for insiders to exploit private information to 
expropriate wealth from uninformed bond traders.” Consequently, to take full 
advantage of his private information, the informed trader will choose to trade a certain 
amount of high-yield bonds, in addition to some quantity of stocks and options of the 
issuer. 
 
In addition to higher transaction costs from more aggressive trading in stocks 
and options, there are other important factors that play a role in encouraging an 
informed trader to trade in the junk bond market.  These factors include some common 
practices within the bond industry, and the trader's degree of risk aversion.  First, 
differing from the equity market, the high-yield corporate debt market is largely 
institutional.  Institutional investors who trade high-yield corporate bonds sometimes 
buy syndicated loans for the same company issuing high-yield bonds.  In addition, 
these investors in syndicated loans are often also traders, who trade bank loans next to 
high-yield bonds.  In fact, it is quite often that a single trader at a hedge fund deals in 
all of a company's debt instruments. Under such porous circumstances, keeping 
private information private and avoiding improper use of this information is a 
challenge.  "You can't put a Chinese wall through someone's head," says Michael 
Kaplan, a partner in the corporate practice at law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell3. 
 
Second, for some risk averse investors, even if they have access to some 
information about a pending large change in the firm’s asset value, they might choose 
to trade in bonds to stay away from down-side risk, as their aversion to risk cannot be 
fully eliminated by the piece of information they have, especially when they are not so 
                                                 
3 For further discussion of insider trading in the bond market, see a recent article by Carolyn Sargent: 
“The New Insider Trading?” Investment Dealers’ Digest, October 31st, 2005. 
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sure about the quality of the information.  While it is true that the down-side risk can 
be easily hedged in the options market, associated transaction costs might render direct 
trading in bonds a better choice. 
 
If an informed trader trades corporate bonds as well as stocks and options, new 
information will be disseminated in all three related markets.  Thus, current bond 
prices hypothetically contain valuable information about future price movements in 
the stock and options markets.  Taking advantage of a unique corporate bond 
transaction dataset for a set of 50 most frequently traded high-yield corporate bonds 
from NASD, this paper empirically tests this hypothesis and explores the dynamics of 
information flow across related markets  by examining the pair-wise lead-lag relations 
between stocks, corporate bonds and options.  Differing from previous studies, I find 
that current high-yield corporate bond price changes have explanatory power for 
future stock returns.  This implies that the bond market serves an important role in 
disseminating new information.  The option market, however, contains valuable 
information about future movements in both the stock and the bond market, and these 
relations are unidirectional, suggesting that the option market is a preferred venue for 
informed trading.  Furthermore, there is strong evidence that informed trading in the 
option market is distributed across different strike prices, with at-the-money options 
attracting investors who posses mild firm-specific information, and deep out-of-the-
money options catching the attention of those who obtain extreme information. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes some 
recent developments in the corporate bond over-the-counter (OTC) market and the 
new Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) introduced by NASD.  The 
stock, bond and options data are described in Section 3.  Section 4 investigates 
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pairwise lead-lag relationships between stocks, bonds and options.  Whether these 
relationships are subject to infrequent trading in bonds and how they vary with firm 
size are addressed in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes and points out some possible 
extensions. 
 
The Corporate Bond Market and NASD’s TRACE 
 
The corporate bond market assumes roughly as important a role in corporate 
financing as the equity market, with approximately $4.4 trillion outstanding in 2004, 
which is larger than both the US treasury market ($3.8 trillion outstanding) and the 
municipal bond market ($2.0 trillion outstanding)4.  The stock market is larger at 
about $15 trillion5.  The total dollar volume of the bond market in 2003 is about $10 
trillion, more than the trading volume on the NYSE6.  About $18 billion in par value 
of corporate bonds turns over in roughly 22,000 transactions on a typical day7.  As 
baby-boomers age and shift more of their assets from equity investments to debt 
investments, the corporate bond market will certainly grow in both size and 
importance. 
 
However, transparency in this market has never been comparable to that of 
other securities markets.  As Doug Shulman (NASD’s President of Markets) said, the 
corporate bond market ‘has been largely a mystery to retail investors’.  Following 
insider trading and price manipulation scandals in the corporate bond market in the 
late 1980's, the opaqueness of the corporate fixed-income market, especially that of 
                                                 
4 NASD News Release, March 26th, 2004. 
5 Business Times, Feb 8th, 2005 
6 The Economist, Oct 14th, 2004 
7 See a speech by Doug Shulman, NASD’s President of Markets, on February 2nd, 2005 in New York, 
New York, ‘Bond Market Association Legal and Compliance Conference Keynote Address’, which is 
on the NASD’s website.  
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the high-yield bond market, became a really big concern for the U.S. Congress and the 
SEC.  The Fixed Income Pricing System (FIPS) was the result of discussions between 
the SEC and the NASD on how to increase the transparency of the junk bond market.  
FIPS helps regulators effectively monitor trading in high-yield debt.  On April 11th, 
1994, The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., began operation of FIPS for members trading 
high-yield bonds.  Under the FIPS system, NASD members are required to report all 
secondary market transactions on a selected set of high-yield bonds within 5 minutes 
of execution.  Based on submitted transaction reports, hourly price and volume data on 
about 50 most frequently traded high-yield bonds are displayed on the FIPS terminal.  
Even though FIPS brought some transparency to the high-yield debt market, the 
corporate debt market as a whole still does not live up to regulators’ expectation of a 
transparent market.  In 1998, former SEC Chairman Levitt noted that "[t]he sad truth 
is that investors in the corporate bond market do not enjoy the same access to 
information as a car buyer or a homebuyer or, dare I say, a fruit buyer."  In order to 
further increase the transparency of the corporate bond markets, NASD initiated a 
broader system know as TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine) on July 
1st, 2002, which incorporated the previous FIPS system.  Under TRACE rules8 , all 
NASD members were obligated to submit transaction reports for any secondary 
market transaction in TRACE-eligible securities9 between 8:00PM and 6:30PM (EST) 
within one hour and fifteen minutes of the time of execution10.  Transaction 
                                                 
8 Also known as the NASD Rule 6200 Series. 
9 According to NASD Rule 6210(a), TRACE-eligible security ‘mean all United States dollar 
denominated debt securities that are depository eligible securities under Rule 11310(d); Investment 
Grade or Non-Investment Grade; issued by United States and/or foreign private issuers; and: (1) 
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 and purchased or sold pursuant to Rule 144A of the 
Securities Act of 1933.’ It does not include debt securities issued by government-sponsored entities 
(GSE), mortgage-backed or asset-backed securities, collateralized mortgage obligations and money 
market instruments. 
10 For a detailed description of TRACE rules and their subsequent amendments, please refer to NASD 
Notice to Members NtM-02-76, NtM-03-12, NtM-03-22, NtM-03-36, NtM-03-45, NtM-04-39 and 
NtM-04-65. 
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information on TRACE-eligible securities which are investment grade11 and have an 
initial issuance of $1 billion or higher is subject to immediate dissemination.  
Additionally, 50 Non-Investment grade and most actively traded TRACE-eligible 
securities (TRACE 50 thereafter) are designated for dissemination.  In the subsequent 
two and half years, major improvements to the TRACE system have focused on 
increasing dissemination and reducing reporting time.  As of July 1st, 2002, only 540 
securities are subject to dissemination.  This number went up to 4,500 after NASD 
began distributing information on a third group of Investment Grade TRACE-eligible 
securities that are rated ‘A3’ or higher by Moody’s or ‘A-’ or higher by S&P and have 
a $100 million or higher original issue size on March 3rd, 2003, and another group of 
120’Baa/BBB’ rated bonds on April 14th, 2003.  After another two-stage 
implementation of the amendments to the TRACE Rules, which were approved by 
SEC on September 3rd, 2004, NASD started full dissemination of transaction 
information on all TRACE-eligible securities except those Section 4(2)/Rule 144A 
TRACE-eligible securities.  Currently about 29,000 corporate bonds, another jump 
from 17,000 as of October 1st, 2004, have their transaction and price data spread to the 
market in real-time, and the corporate bond markets have never before been so 
transparent.  Meanwhile, the time to report a trade of a Trace-eligible security has 
been declining.  Starting from 75 minutes on July 1st, 2002, the reporting period went 
down to 45 minutes on October 1st, 2003 and further down to 30 minutes on October 
1st, 2004. It was shortened to just 15 minutes on July 1st, 2005.  
 
TRACE improves on FIPS in several important ways.  First, FIPS only 
covered non-convertible, non-investment grade and publicly offered debt which is not 
                                                 
11 Rated by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization (NRSRO) in one of its four highest 
generic rating categories. See NASD Rule 6210(h). 
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part of a medium-term note program12, and only a set of 50 most actively traded bonds 
were subject to dissemination.  However, under TRACE rules, transaction information 
for any secondary market transaction in all TRAC-eligible securities are required to be 
reported to NASD, and starting February 7th, 2005, NASD has begun to fully 
disseminate transaction information on the entire universe of corporate bonds, which 
is considered by NASD as the most significant innovation for retail bond investors in 
decades.  Second, for each debt security that is subject to dissemination, TRACE 
dramatically increase the amount of information distributed to the public.  FIPS only 
published hourly summaries on the prices and total volume of transaction in a set of 
50 bonds, while transaction and price data on each trade in TRACE-eligible securities 
are distributed to the market.  
 
Data 
 
The transaction dataset for TRACE 50 high-yield bonds contains execution 
date and time (recorded to the second), price, yield, quantity, and some other 
information that can be used to purge invalid transaction reports for every trade from 
July 1st, 2002 to September 30th, 200413. The TRACE 50 bonds are chosen by the 
NASD advisory committee based on criteria such as the security’s volume, price, 
name recognition, amount of research attracted, a minimum amount of bonds 
outstanding, number of dealers that are making a market in this security and the 
security’s contribution to the TRACE 50’s industry diversity.  Similar to FIPS 50, the 
TRACE 50 are characterized by high trading volume, both in terms of number of 
transactions and number of block size trades, and similar trading patterns to the 
                                                 
12 Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., 1997, Rule 6210(i). 
13 On October 1st, 2004, NASD started its second stage dissemination, and many more high-yield 
bonds are subject to dissemination. The concept of TRACE 50 does not exist any more.   
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issuer’s stock.  Over time, bonds with small trading volume were replaced with more 
active bonds.  Transaction information on the first TRACE 50 bonds was released to 
the market on real-time basis for about one year since July 1st, 2002.  Beginning on 
July 13th, 2003, the TRACE 50 list was updated every 3 month until September 30th, 
2004.  During this time period (July 1st, 2002 to September 30th, 2004), 177 high-yield 
bonds from 135 issuing firms were included in the TRACE 50 lists for dissemination. 
 
Daily closing stock price and related options quotes data for the issuing firms 
are obtained from OptionMetrics INC for the period from July 1st, 2002 to April 15th, 
2004.  Only 129 bonds from 110 firms are subject to dissemination during this period.  
Since some companies are not public, and some are traded on the OTC market or the 
pink sheet market, stock price data do not exist for 18 of these firms.  This reduces the 
sample to 92 firms.  Furthermore, 15 out of the 92 firms do not have options traded on 
their common stock during this period.  By excluding these 15 firms from my sample, 
I was left with 77 firms with 111 bonds.   
 
To avoid potential bias from non-synchronous trading, a daily time series 
dataset is formed by keeping the transaction price for the last valid trade before 
4:00PM (EST) for each of these 111 bonds.  As several firms have multiple bonds 
included in TRACE 50 list during certain periods of time, only the most active bond 
with the highest priority in payments is kept for inter-market analysis14.  As a result, a 
panel of daily stock, bond and options data for 77 firms is employed for this study. 
 
Table 1 contains summary characteristics for the 77 corporate bonds and their 
                                                 
14 Examining the price behavior of different bonds issued by the same firm is another interesting topic 
for future research.  
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issuing firms at the time of their initial entry to the TRACE 50 list.  Issuing firms are 
fairly large with median total asset value of 11471.1 million USD and characterized by 
high financial leverage, which is consistent with low credit ratings of these bonds.  
Also consistent with the high-yield nature, many bonds in the sample contain 
embedded options.  Of the 77 bonds, 38 (49.35%) are callable prior to maturity and 14 
(18.18%) are convertible. The bonds included in this study represent 7 different 
industries and they are concentrated in Manufacturing (38.96%), Servicing (31.17%) 
and Energy (11.69%).  About half of the 77 bonds are senior unsecured notes.  Senior 
notes and subordinated notes account for another 30 percent of the sample.  Coupon 
payments are made twice per year for each of the 77 bonds, and all are fixed plain 
vanilla coupons, except for one bond which has a variable coupon size.  The average 
coupon rate is 7.48%.  About 80% of the TRACE 50 bonds are rated no lower than B- 
by S&P and none of them defaulted during the sample period.  
 
The use of option quotes data, instead of transaction data, deserves some 
comments.  Information-based market microstructure models demonstrate that the bid-
ask spread reflects a balancing of losses to the informed traders with gains from the 
uninformed traders and therefore contains information about the probability of trading 
on private information in the market [See Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992)].  In addition, as shown by 
Chan, Chung and Fong (2002), because of generally larger bid-ask spread in the 
option market, as documented by Vijh (1999), informed traders might have an 
incentive to submit limit orders instead of market orders, and hence quote revisions 
contain valuable information about future market movements.  Moreover, since 
corporate bonds embed a short position in puts on the value of the firm, call option 
data are eliminated from the sample.  Finally, as will be shown in the next section,  
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of 77 TRACE 50 Bonds and Their Issuing Firm 
 
Panel A: 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev 
Assets 11471.1 8394 523.8 63545 10195.2 
Leverage 0.7819 0.7773 0.3586 1.9119 0.2128 
Coupon Rate 7.4812 7.875 1.25 11 2.2228 
Time to Maturity 6.369 5.8344 2.0862 26.705 3.3646 
Panel B: 
Bond Type SRDEB SRNT SRSECNT SRSUBNT 
Number of Bonds 1 12 2 8 
Percentage 1.32 15.79 2.63 10.53 
Bond Type SRUNNT SUBDEB SUBNT UNNT 
Number of Bonds 38 1 10 4 
Percentage 50 1.32 13.16 5.26 
Panel C: 
S&P Rating BBB BB B CCC CC C NR 
Number of Bonds 7 24 29 7 1 1 7 
Percentage 9.21 31.58 38.16 9.21 1.32 1.32 9.21 
Panel D: 
Coupon Type Variable Plain Vanilla Fixed Coupon 
Number of Bonds 1 76 
Percentage 1.3 98.7 
Panel E: 
Payment Frequency Semiannually 
Number of Bonds 77 
Percentage 100 
Panel F: 
Industry CG ENGY FIN MANU SERV TELE TRANS 
Number of Bonds 1 9 7 30 24 5 1 
Percentage 1.3 11.69 9.09 38.96 31.17 6.49 1.3 
Panel G: 
Callable  Yes No 
Number of Bonds 38 39 
Percentage 49.35 50.65 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) 
Panel H: 
Convertible Yes No 
Number of Bonds 14 63 
Percentage 18.18 81.82 
 
This table contains summary characteristics for the 77 corporate bonds and their 
issuing firms at the time of their initial entry to the TRACE 50 list.  Firm 
characteristics are based on data from COMPUSTAT, while bond characteristics are 
determined from the TRACE 50 dataset.  Most of these descriptive bond data were 
obtained from NASD, with the remainder provided by the issuing firms.  The following 
abbreviations are used in this table: for bond type, SRDEB (Senior Debenture), SRNT 
(Senior Note), SRSECNT (Senior Secured Note), SRSUBNT (Senior Subordinated 
Note), SRUNNT (Senior Unsecured Note), SUBDEB  (Subordinated Debenture), 
SUBNT (Subordinated Note) and UNNT (Unsecured Note); for industry, CG 
(Consumer Goods), ENGY (Energy), FIN (Financial), MANU (Manufacturing), SERV 
(Services), TELE (Telecommunications) and TRANS (Transportation). 
 
ATM options and OTM options carry different information about future movements in 
stocks and bonds. Therefore, both ATM and deep OTM put option spreads are kept for 
each firm. 
 
Inter-Market Relationships between Stocks, Bonds and Options 
 
If new information about the value of an individual firm exists in the market, it 
should be reflected in the prices of the firm’s stock and options, as well as its bonds.  
This section provides a comprehensive examination of pair-wise relationships between 
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stocks, bonds and options.  Daily stock returns, SRi,t, and daily bond returns, BRi,t, are 
calculated using the end-of-day closing prices.  For the options market, normalized 
spreads for both ATM and deep OTM puts are calculated by dividing the bid-ask 
spread by the midpoint of bid and ask quotes.  These are denoted as ASi,t and OSi,t 
respectively.   
 
In order to isolate interest rate risk, for each individual corporate bond I 
construct a corresponding default-free bond whose future cash flows match those of 
the corporate bond perfectly.  The price of default-free bonds can simply be calculated 
by discounting the cash flows at corresponding default-free zero-coupon interest rates.  
These zero-coupon rates are estimated by employing a modified version of the 
extended Nelson-Siegel model [Bliss (1997)] on the observed on-the-run Treasury 
curve15: 
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15 Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) calculate these default-free zero-coupon rates by using a method 
proposed by Fisher, Nychka, and Zervos (1994). However, based on a series of parametric and 
nonparametric tests, Bliss (1997) compares five distinct term structure estimation methods, including 
the smoothed and unsmoothed Fama-Bliss methods, the McCulloch model, the Fisher-Nychka-Zervos 
method and the extended Nelson-Siegel model, and concludes that the Fisher-Nychka-Zervos method 
does almost always poorly relative to the other four alternatives, in terms of both in-sample goodness-
of-fit and out-of-sample performance.    
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In this model, m  represents time to maturity, )(mr  is the discount rate for 
coupon or principal payments at time m , d  denote Macaulay duration, and  c  refers 
to cash flows.  Based on the prices of the constructed default-free bonds, their returns, 
DRi,t, can be readily calculated.  Furthermore, to control for the effect of market-wide 
information, I include the S&P 500 index return, denoted as MRt, in the model.  Data 
for both the observed on-the-run Treasury curve and the S&P 500 index return are 
retrieved from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
 
The Empirical Model 
 
To examine whether information-based trading takes place in the corporate bond 
market, the following panel Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model with two 
controlling variables is estimated.  Based on this model, Granger causality tests are 
conducted to identify pairwise lead-lag relationships between stocks, bonds and 
options: 
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and 
(1.15) ]'[ ,4,3,2,1, tititititiE εεεε= .  
 
A, B and C contain parameters to be estimated, and Et is the error vector.  This model 
is estimated by generalized least squares (GLS) with error terms corrected for auto-
correlation. 
As individual corporate bonds tend to be less frequently traded than their 
corresponding stocks and options, even for TRACE 50 which are considered more 
active than other high-yield bonds [Hotchkiss and Nolen (2002)], this model is first 
estimated with data on 48 firms with relatively high bond volume to mitigate potential 
bias introduced by infrequent trading.  Table 2 contains summary statistics about 
characteristics of the 48 bonds and their issuing firms.  
 
Table 1.2: Characteristics of 48 Most Frequently Traded TRACE 50 Bonds and 
Their Issuing Firms 
 
Panel A: 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev 
Assets 14259.7 10709.7 1613 63545 11564.6 
Leverage 0.7963 0.7843 0.4444 1.5206 0.1946 
Coupon Rate 7.4121 7.75 1.25 11 2.247 
Time to Maturity 6.721 5.8344 2.0862 26.705 4.0662 
Panel B: 
Bond Type SRD
EB 
SRNT SRSE
CNT 
SRSU
BNT 
SRUN
NT 
SUBN
T 
UNNT 
Number of Bonds 1 7 2 4 24 7 3 
Percentage 2.08 14.58 4.17 8.33 50.00 14.58 6.25 
Panel C: 
S&P Rating BBB BB B CCC CC C NR 
Number of Bonds 4 16 17 5 1 0 5 
Percentage 8.33 33.33 35.42 10.41 2.08 0.00 10.42 
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Table 1.2 (Continued) 
Panel D: 
Coupon Type Variable Plain Vanilla Fixed Coupon 
Number of Bonds 1 47 
Percentage 2.08 97.92 
Panel E: 
Payment Frequency Semiannually 
Number of Bonds 48 
Percentage 100.00 
Panel F: 
Industry CG ENGY FIN MANU SERV TELE TRANS
Number of Bonds 1 7 4 16 15 5 0 
Percentage 2.08 14.58 8.33 33.33 31.25 10.42 0.00 
Panel G: 
Callable  Yes No 
Number of Bonds 23 25 
Percentage 47.92 52.08 
Panel H: 
Convertible Yes No 
Number of Bonds 12 36 
Percentage 25.00 75.00 
 
This table contains summary characteristics for the 48 most frequently traded TRACE 
50 bonds and their issuing firms at the time of their initial entry to the TRACE 50 list.  
Firm characteristics are based on data from COMPUSTAT, while bond 
characteristics are determined from the TRACE 50 dataset.  Most of these descriptive 
bond data were obtained from NASD, with the remainder provided by the issuing 
firms.  The following abbreviations are used in this table: for bond type, SRDEB 
(Senior Debenture), SRNT (Senior Note), SRSECNT (Senior Secured Note), SRSUBNT 
(Senior Subordinated Note), SRUNNT (Senior Unsecured Note), SUBDEB  
(Subordinated Debenture), SUBNT (Subordinated Note) and UNNT (Unsecured 
Note); for industry, CG (Consumer Goods), ENGY (Energy), FIN (Financial), MANU 
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(Manufacturing), SERV (Services), TELE (Telecommunications) and TRANS 
(Transportation). 
 
Bond-stock relationships 
 
According to the structural firm-value approach to the valuation of corporate 
debt (Merton (1974)), corporate bonds can be viewed as risk-free debt combined with 
a short position in a put on the value of the firm’s assets.  Since equity can be 
considered a call option on the assets, if financial markets are efficient, stock and bond 
prices should move simultaneously with no lead-lag relationship, and the direction of 
contemporaneous movements should reveal the nature of information in the markets:  
information about the mean value of the issuing firm’s assets leads to positive 
correlation between stock and bond returns, while information related to changes in 
the volatility of the firm’s asset returns causes negative correlation.  
 
Due to the lack of adequate corporate bond data, few studies have empirically 
examined the stock-bond relationship.  Early research on the stock-bond linkages has 
been conducted on the aggregate level, looking at low-grade bonds [Blume, Keim and 
Patel (1991), Cornell and Green (1991)].  While both Cornell and Green (1991) and 
Blume, Keim and Patel (1991) find that speculative bonds are very sensitive to stock 
price movements, neither study is able to identify a significant impact of previous or 
future stock returns on current corporate bond returns.  As the corporate bond market 
has become more transparent, two studies in the literature have explicitly examined 
the lead-lag relationship on the individual firm level.  However, their results are 
contradictory.  Using weekly quotes data from Merrill Lynch, Kwan (1996) finds that 
lagged stock returns have explanatory power for current bond yield changes, but not 
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vice versa.  Based on this finding, he concludes that ‘stocks lead bonds in reflecting 
firm-specific information’.  In contrast, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) analyze a 
transaction dataset for 55 high-yield bonds included on the NASD Fixed Income 
Pricing System (FIPS)16 and reject the hypothesis that stocks lead bonds in reflecting 
firm-specific information.  Instead, they argue that no causal stock-bond relationship 
exists, and the observed contemporaneous correlation between stock and bond returns 
only reveals their joint reaction to common factors. 
 
Consistent with Kwan (1996) and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), I find stock 
returns are positively correlated with contemporaneous bond returns with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.154, suggesting that at the individual firm level, information that 
drives individual stock and bond returns is primarily related to the mean value of the 
firm’s asset, not the volatility of asset returns.  Also consistent with Blume, Keim and 
Patel (1991) and Cornell and Green (1991), high-yield bonds are not sensitive to 
movements in interest rates (as the coefficient for DRt is not significant) but are very 
sensitive to changes in stocks prices. The coefficient for MRt is 0.1081, and is 
significant at 5% level. 
 
As to the leads and lags, Table 1.3 shows that lagged stock returns have explanatory 
power for current bond returns, with the coefficients significant at 1% level back to 
day t-5.  Furthermore, Granger causality test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for SRt-1 through SRt-5 are zero at 1% level.  Therefore, there is strong 
evidence that the stock market contains valuable information about future bond 
returns. This result is consistent with the stock lead found in Kwan (1996).   
                                                 
16 For more detailed information about FIPS, see the NASD NtM 94-23, Alexander, Edwards, and 
Ferri (1999, 2000), and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002). 
  20
 
What differentiates my study from previous ones is the finding that current 
stock returns are positively correlated with lagged bond returns (Table 1.4).  
Coefficients for lagged bond returns are both economically and statistically 
significant, not only for day t-1, but for day t-2 and day t-3.  The F-value for testing 
that jt−,12β  equals zero for j=1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 is 3.9121, significant at 1% level.  This 
empirical result, together with the anecdotal evidence introduced above, confirm my 
claim that information-based trading also takes place in the high-yield corporate bond 
market. 
 
The reason that this relationship is not found in Kwan (1996) might be 
attributed to the quality of the data he uses.  First, it is hard to identify active bonds 
using quotes data from a dealer, even though small issues that are subject to infrequent 
trading are eliminated from the sample.  In fact, the use of inactive bonds to examine 
the lead-lag relations might bias his results toward the stock lead.  Second, since 
information (especially publicly released information) is impounded into prices 
quickly, using data on weekly frequency to address the price discovery process is also 
questionable. 
 
The reason that my results are also different from Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) 
is probably due to the fact that they are focusing on the lead-lag relationships at the 
portfolio level, given that the quality of FIPS data they use is close to the TRACE 50 
data in the current study.  They first construct a portfolio of the 20 most frequently 
traded FIPS bonds which were issued by public companies, and then conduct an 
analysis of Granger causality between portfolios of the FIPS bonds and of the 
corresponding stocks. Since aggregation across different bonds and stocks into  
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Table 1.3 Regression of current bond returns on current default-free debt 
returns, market returns, lagged bond returns, lagged ATM put option spreads, 
and lagged deep OTM put option spreads for the 48 firms with frequently traded 
bonds 
 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
 Variable Est. t-value p-value 
1 Constant 0.0015 3.4504 0.0006 
2 DR 0.0482 0.9116 0.3620 
3 MR 0.1081 4.4336 0.0000 
4 SR{1} 0.1410 20.3446 0.0000 
5 SR{2} 0.0887 12.4303 0.0000 
6 SR{3} 0.0473 6.5836 0.0000 
7 SR{4} 0.0264 3.7171 0.0002 
8 SR{5} 0.0182 2.5803 0.0099 
9 BR{1} -0.3014 -24.3606 0.0000 
10 BR{2} -0.1520 -11.8846 0.0000 
11 BR{3} -0.0899 -7.0288 0.0000 
12 BR{4} -0.0680 -5.4416 0.0000 
13 BR{5} -0.0632 -5.4159 0.0000 
14 AS{1} -0.0006 -0.9793 0.3275 
15 AS{2} 0.0006 0.7520 0.4521 
16 AS{3} -0.0001 -0.0875 0.9303 
17 AS{4} -0.0002 -0.3191 0.7497 
18 AS{5} 0.0007 1.1255 0.2604 
19 OS{1} -0.0382 -1.0249 0.3054 
20 OS{2} -0.0328 -0.7880 0.4307 
21 OS{3} 0.0349 0.8386 0.4017 
22 OS{4} 0.0367 0.8842 0.3766 
23 OS{5} -0.0265 -0.7091 0.4783 
24 Adj R-Square 0.1521   
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Table 1.3 (Continued) 
Panel B: Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis : 
The Following Coefficients Are Zero F-value p-value 
SR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 132.7280 0.0000  
AS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 0.5171  0.7635 
OS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 2.5503  0.0259  
 
Panel A presents the results from estimating the following model: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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SR and BR represent daily stock return and bond return, calculated from end-of-day 
closing prices.  MR is the S&P 500 index return, and DR denotes return on a default-
free debt with future cash flows matched perfectly with the high-yield corporate bond.  
AS and OS stand for ATM put options spreads and OTM put options spreads 
respectively.  They are normalized by dividing the bid-ask spreads by the average of 
bid and ask quotes. Panel B contains the results from Granger Causality tests on 
whether all 21β , 23β , and 24β  are equal to zero.  
 
portfolios could possibly remove information about informed trading in stocks and 
bonds at the individual firm level, lead-lag relationships on the firm level are not 
specifically addressed in their study and hence constitute one of the major topics for 
this paper. 
 
Moreover, the evidence that both lagged stock returns and lagged bond returns 
predict current prices movements implies that it takes time for new information to 
become incorporated into security prices.  Compared to the corporate bond market, the 
stock market is informationally more efficient.  According to the results reported in 
Table 3, lagged stock returns only for time t-1 is statistically significant at the 5% 
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Table 1.4: Regression of current stock returns on current default-free debt 
returns, market returns, lagged bond returns, lagged ATM put option spreads, 
and lagged deep OTM put option spreads for the 48 firms with frequently traded 
bonds 
 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
 Variable Est. t-value p-value 
1 Constant 0.0016 2.4145 0.0158 
2 DR -0.1086 -1.2622 0.2069 
3 MR 1.3096 32.9130 0.0000 
4 SR{1} 0.1823 16.1368 0.0000 
5 SR{2} -0.0094 -0.8059 0.4203 
6 SR{3} -0.0197 -1.6679 0.0954 
7 SR{4} -0.0195 -1.6764 0.0937 
8 SR{5} 0.0219 1.9043 0.0569 
9 BR{1} 0.0404 2.0034 0.0452 
10 BR{2} 0.0851 4.1485 0.0000 
11 BR{3} 0.0363 1.7699 0.0768 
12 BR{4} 0.0287 1.4297 0.1529 
13 BR{5} 0.0037 0.1921 0.8477 
14 AS{1} -0.0027 -2.5129 0.0120 
15 AS{2} 0.0004 0.3540 0.7233 
16 AS{3} 0.0016 1.2257 0.2204 
17 AS{4} 0.0014 1.1121 0.2661 
18 AS{5} -0.0002 -0.1651 0.8689 
19 OS{1} -0.0529 -0.8697 0.3845 
20 OS{2} -0.0027 -0.0382 0.9695 
21 OS{3} 0.0206 0.2952 0.7678 
22 OS{4} -0.0223 -0.3199 0.7491 
23 OS{5} 0.0241 0.3954 0.6926 
24 Adj R-Square 0.1639   
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
Panel B: Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis : 
The Following Coefficients Are Zero F-value p-value 
BR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 3.9121 0.0015 
AS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 2.3846 0.0360 
OS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 1.0243 0.4013 
 
Panel A presents the results from estimating the following model: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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SR and BR represent daily stock return and bond return, calculated from end-of-day 
closing prices.  MR is the S&P 500 index return, and DR denotes return on a default-
free debt with future cash flows matched perfectly with the high-yield corporate bond.  
AS and OS stand for ATM put options spreads and OTM put options spreads 
respectively.  They are normalized by dividing the bid-ask spreads by the average of 
bid and ask quotes. Panel B contains the results from Granger Causality tests on 
whether all 12β , 13β , and 14β  are equal to zero. 
 
 
level, and the magnitude drops dramatically after time t-1, while lagged bond returns 
are statistically significant for both time t-1 and t-2, with even much higher magnitude 
for time t-2.  This indicates that information gets impounded in stock prices within one 
day, while it takes the corporate bond market much longer to adjust to the new 
information, a conclusion that differs from Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) where they 
argue that market quality is no poorer for bonds than for their underlying stocks. 
 
To summarize, even though the stock market and the bond market differ in 
degree of informational efficiency, an informed trader trades in both the stock market 
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and the high-yield corporate bond market on their private information, and both 
markets serve important informational roles in the price discovery process.  
 
Bond-option relationships 
 
Compared to a small body of work on the stock-bond interrelation, literature 
on whether the corporate bond market also contains important information as to future 
movements in the option market is literally blank.  Following Beckers (1981), who 
suggests that ATM options contain most of the relevant information in predicting 
future market volatility, most empirical studies on the links between options and 
equity markets focus on data for at- and near-the-money options.  Chakravarty, Gulen 
and Mayhew (2004) find that on average, the information share of the price discovery 
process tends to be higher for OTM options than ATM options.  Furthermore, as 
corporate bonds embed a short position in OTM put options on credit risk, it is very 
natural to check the OTM option market.  In this paper, I use the bid-ask spreads in 
both OTM and ATM put options as a measure of information-based trading on the 
options market. 
 
Table 1.3, 1.5 and 1.6 establish a very interesting relation between the 
corporate bond market and the option market.  Even though none of the coefficients 
for lagged deep OTM put spreads are significant in explaining current bond returns 
(Table 1.3), Granger causality tests do reject the null hypothesis that lagged OTM 
spreads, as a whole, have no explanatory power (with an F-value 2.5503 and  a 
significance level of 0.0259).  On the other hand, as shown by Table 1.6, when current 
deep OTM put option spreads are regressed on lagged bond returns, none of the 
coefficients are significant at any sensible level.  Furthermore, Granger causality tests 
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cannot reject that all coefficients are equal to zero.  Therefore, OTM put spreads 
contain valuable information that can help to predict future bond returns, indicating 
that investors prefer to trade OTM options rather than high-yield corporate bonds. 
 
The option lead, however, is not confirmed when I examine the relationship 
between bonds and ATM options.  Table 1.3 shows that lagged ATM put option 
spreads have no explanatory power for current bond returns.  Thefore, if an informed 
investor obtains some information that will affect the value of both corporate bonds 
and options, trading OTM options is her first choice.  This is because for delta-
equivalent positions, deep OTM put options are more subject to a crash in a firm’s 
value than ATM options.  As a result, informed traders who obtain very bad news 
about a firm will prefer to buy OTM puts on the firm’s stock, which will be reflected 
in the bid-ask spreads.  On the other hand, since corporate bonds embed a short 
position in OTM puts, only information about a possible crash in the firm’s value, and 
hence default in future interests and principal payments will affect the bond price.  
Therefore, the evidence of OTM put option spreads predicting future bond returns 
indicates that the option market is leading the bond market in reflecting extreme firm-
specific information.  This explanation from the perspective of the nature of private 
information can be further strengthened by the lead-lag relations between options and 
stocks discussed in the following subsection. 
 
Stock-option relationships 
 
To complete the examination of information flow across stocks, bonds and options, I 
check whether the option market contains valuable information about future stock 
returns.  Following seminal work by Black (1975), there has been a huge literature 
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Table 1.5: Regression of current ATM put option spreads on current default-free 
debt returns, market returns, lagged bond returns, lagged ATM put option 
spreads, and lagged deep OTM put option spreads for the 48 firms with 
frequently traded bonds  
 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
 Variable Est. t-value p-value 
1 Constant 0.0570 9.6733 0.0000 
2 DR -0.4610 -0.4979 0.6186 
3 MR 1.2476 2.8417 0.0045 
4 SR{1} -0.1172 -0.8746 0.3818 
5 SR{2} -0.0381 -0.2496 0.8029 
6 SR{3} 0.0246 0.1583 0.8742 
7 SR{4} -0.1119 -0.7449 0.4563 
8 SR{5} 0.0057 0.0420 0.9665 
9 BR{1} 0.1325 0.5591 0.5761 
10 BR{2} 0.3471 1.4638 0.1433 
11 BR{3} 0.0462 0.1902 0.8491 
12 BR{4} 0.5185 2.2185 0.0266 
13 BR{5} -0.0036 -0.0161 0.9872 
14 AS{1} 1.0232 82.4139 0.0000 
15 AS{2} -0.3624 -20.4031 0.0000 
16 AS{3} 0.2108 11.5775 0.0000 
17 AS{4} -0.0872 -4.8705 0.0000 
18 AS{5} 0.0557 4.4403 0.0000 
19 OS{1} -0.3159 -0.4433 0.6576 
20 OS{2} 0.2105 0.2154 0.8295 
21 OS{3} 0.6640 0.6836 0.4943 
22 OS{4} -0.9196 -0.9414 0.3465 
23 OS{5} 1.1852 1.6523 0.0985 
24 Adj R-Square 0.4830   
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Table 1.5 (Continued) 
Panel B: Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis : 
The Following Coefficients Are Zero F-value p-value 
SR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 0.3682  0.8706  
BR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 1.3770  0.2295  
OS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 7.0489  0.0000  
 
Panel A presents the results from estimating the following model: 
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SR and BR represent daily stock return and bond return, calculated from end-of-day 
closing prices.  MR is the S&P 500 index return, and DR denotes return on a default-
free debt with future cash flows matched perfectly with the high-yield corporate bond.  
AS and OS stand for ATM put options spreads and OTM put options spreads 
respectively.  They are normalized by dividing the bid-ask spreads by the average of 
bid and ask quotes. Panel B contains the results from Granger Causality tests on 
whether all 31β , 32β , and 34β  are equal to zero. 
 
 
studying inter-market relationships between equity and equity derivative markets.  As 
suggested by Black (1975), the option market might be more attractive to informed 
traders than the market for the underlying stock because options offer higher financial 
leverage, and the option market is characterized by less stringent margin requirements, 
no uptick rule for short selling, and probably lower transaction costs.  Whether the 
option market is leading the stock market in reflecting new information has been  
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Table 1.6: Regression of current OTM put option spreads on current default-free 
debt returns, market returns, lagged bond returns, lagged ATM put option 
spreads, and lagged deep OTM put option spreads for the 48 firms with 
frequently traded bonds  
 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
 Variable Est. t-value p-value 
1 Constant 0.0002 2.0223 0.0432 
2 DR -0.0102 -0.6509 0.5151 
3 MR 0.0169 2.2759 0.0229 
4 SR{1} 0.0027 1.1792 0.2384 
5 SR{2} 0.0027 1.0148 0.3102 
6 SR{3} 0.0009 0.3306 0.7410 
7 SR{4} 0.0015 0.5689 0.5694 
8 SR{5} 0.0021 0.8884 0.3744 
9 BR{1} 0.0008 0.2023 0.8397 
10 BR{2} -0.0013 -0.3050 0.7603 
11 BR{3} -0.0016 -0.3749 0.7078 
12 BR{4} -0.0010 -0.2455 0.8061 
13 BR{5} -0.0044 -1.1453 0.2521 
14 AS{1} 0.0001 0.2999 0.7643 
15 AS{2} -0.0002 -0.6350 0.5255 
16 AS{3} 0.0002 0.7181 0.4728 
17 AS{4} 0.0001 0.2940 0.7688 
18 AS{5} 0.0000 0.1593 0.8735 
19 OS{1} 0.9952 81.1621 0.0000 
20 OS{2} -0.3339 -19.3703 0.0000 
21 OS{3} 0.3232 18.7878 0.0000 
22 OS{4} -0.1152 -6.6814 0.0000 
23 OS{5} 0.1199 9.7091 0.0000 
24 Adj R-Square 0.9231   
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Table 1.6 (Continued) 
Panel B: Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis : 
The Following Coefficients Are Zero F-value p-value 
BR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 1.6781 0.1361 
AS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 0.3417 0.8878 
OS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 0.8776 0.4951 
 
Panel A presents the results from estimating the following model: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = =
−−−−−−−− +++++++=
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
,4,,44,,43,,42,,41,42414,
j j j j
tijtijjtijjtijjtijtitti OSASBRSRDRMROS εββββγγα
SR and BR represent daily stock return and bond return, calculated from end-of-day 
closing prices.  MR is the S&P 500 index return, and DR denotes return on a default-
free debt with future cash flows matched perfectly with the high-yield corporate bond.  
AS and OS stand for ATM put options spreads and OTM put options spreads 
respectively.  They are normalized by dividing the bid-ask spreads by the average of 
bid and ask quotes. Panel B contains the results from Granger Causality tests on 
whether all 41β , 42β , and 43β  are equal to zero.  
 
directly examined in numerous empirical studies17.  Panton (1976) takes the first step 
                                                 
17 The stock-option link and the role of the options market in the price discovery process have also 
been addressed indirectly from many perspectives.  Early accounting research shows that current option 
prices reflect market anticipation of forthcoming earnings announcements and predict future stock price 
variability [Patell and Wolfson (1979, 1981)].  The informational role of options markets are further 
investigated in the financial markets literature.   Jennings and Starks (1986) find that the stock prices of 
firms with listed options adjust to earnings announcements faster than those of nonoption firms and they 
conclude that options markets help to disseminate earnings news.  Grossman (1988) argues that option 
trading reveals the future trading intentions of investors, and therefore helps to predict future price 
volatility.  By comparing return patterns in contemporaneous stock and options, as well as options that 
are adjusted for contemporaneous changes in the price and volatility of the underlying asset, Sheikh and 
Ronn (1994) confirm informed trading in options markets.  Figlewski and Webb (1993) show that 
options increase both transactional and informational efficiency of the market for the underlying stocks 
by reducing the effect of short selling constraints.  A less-related literature examines hedging-related 
effects of option trading and their implications for inter-market linkages. When the complete market 
assumption under standard option pricing models is relaxed, introduction of options alters investors’ 
hedging opportunities. The value of the underlying stocks increases while excess return volatility 
declines. This phenomenon has been documented in several empirical studies (Nabar and Park (1988), 
Skinner (1989), Conrad (1989)) and is subsequently formalized by DeTemple and Selden (1991) in a 
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in this direction, but he fails to demonstrate conclusively that call options are in 
general valid predictors of future stock price changes.  Based on the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model, Latane and Rendleman (1976) and Beckers (1981) derive the 
volatility implied in option prices and show that it predicts future stock price 
variability.  The leading role of the option market is strengthened by Manaster and 
Rendleman (1982), where they compare the implied and observed stock prices and 
demonstrate that the implied stock prices contain valuable information about the 
equilibrium prices of the underlying stocks that has not been revealed in the stock 
market.  Furthermore, Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley (1996) compare the transaction 
costs in the stock and the option markets, and show that for individual stocks, price 
discovery happens in the stock market as it offers lower spreads and higher liquidity.  
However, Vijh (1988) argues that the result of Manaster and Rendleman (1982) is 
questionable, since using daily closing prices introduces a bias associated with the bid-
ask spread and nonsynchronous trading.  After purging the effects of bid-ask spreads, 
Stephan and Whaley (1990) find that the stock market leads the option market.  
Nevertheless, Chan et al. (1993) argue that the stock lead is due to the relative smaller 
stock tick.  If the average of the bid and ask is used instead of the transaction price, 
neither market leads the other. 
 
While most work by middle 90s investigate the price relation between stocks 
and options, recently studies on the lead-lag relation have been focused more on 
                                                                                                                                            
theoretical model.  While most studies confirm the important role of options markets in the general 
price formation process, two exceptions stand out. Bhattacharya (1987) tries to compare implied bid 
and ask stock prices, which are derived from options quotes, to observed bid and ask stock prices to 
identify arbitrage opportunities. He fails to find any profitable trading strategies and hence cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that option prices bear no additional information over that contained in 
contemporaneous stock prices.  By examining the depth and bid-ask spreads of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE), Vijh (1990) shows that the options market is not dominated by informed 
traders. 
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trading volume18.  Easley et al. (1998) show that “positive news option volumes” and 
“negative news option volumes” have predictive power for future stock price changes.  
The predictive ability of option trading volume is subsequently confirmed by Pan and 
Poteshman (2003), but not by Chan, Chung and Fong (2002).  Cao, Chen and Griffin 
(2003) find that option volume imbalances are informative in the presence of pending 
extreme information events, but they fail to identify the same information role for 
option volume during normal periods.  By measuring the relative share of price 
discovery occurring in the stock and options markets, Chakravarty, Gulen and 
Mayhew (2004) conclude that informed trading takes place in both stock and option 
markets, suggesting an important informational role for option volume.  Following 
Chan, Chung and Fong (2002), who suggest that option quote revisions contain 
information about future price movements, this study uses bid-ask spreads for both 
ATM and deep OTM options. Consistent with Chan, Chung and Fong (2002), I find 
an informational role for option quote revisions.  Table 1.4 shows that current stock 
returns are negatively correlated with ATM put spreads for the previous day, and 
lagged ATM put option spreads Granger cause current stock returns (F-value of 
2.3846, significant at 5% level).  Since lagged stock returns have no explanatory 
power for current ATM put spreads, it is safe to conclude that trading in options leads 
trading in the underlying stocks, with a one-day lag.  This conclusion complements the 
findings of a one-day lead of options by Manaster and Rendleman (1982) based on 
transaction price data, and that of Anthony (1988) with volume data.  It also supports 
the argument that informed traders might submit limit orders in the option market to 
exploit their private information.   
                                                 
18 Trading volume relations in the stock and options markets have been explored by Anthony (1988) 
and Stephan and Whaley (1990).  While Anthony (1988) finds weak evidence of the option lead based 
on a daily dataset, Stephan and Whaley (1990) use intraday transaction data and draw an opposite 
conclusion.  However, using total call option volume over a certain period of time is subject to question 
as its information content is hard to interpret.  
  33
 
Interestingly, the leading role of option quote revisions can not be confirmed 
by deep OTM options.  Lagged deep OTM put spreads do not predict current stock 
returns (Table 1.4), nor are lagged stock returns correlated with current OTM spreads 
(Table 1.6).  This result contradicts that of Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew (2004), 
where they argue the average information share is significantly higher for OTM 
options than for ATM options.  If the higher information share for OTM options in the 
price discovery process can be attributed to their higher leverage, the superior 
predictive power of ATM option spreads might reside in their tighter bid-ask spreads 
compared to OTM options.  However, this explanation is not very convincing as 
informed traders tend to submit limit orders in the option market to avoid higher 
options spreads relative to those of stocks. 
 
The finding that current stock returns can be predicted by lagged spreads for 
ATM puts but not OTM puts can be explained by the kind of information investors 
trade on.  Compared to deep OTM put options, ATM puts are more sensitive to 
changes in the mean value of a firm’s assets, especially when the changes are not 
dramatic.  Therefore, unless there is “crash” information about the firm’s value, which 
will change the moneyness of the deep OTM put options, informed traders are more 
likely to trade ATM options. The clustering of informed trading in ATM options 
makes ATM option spreads capable of predicting future stock price changes, leading 
to the conclusion that the option market is leading the stock market in reflecting mild 
firm-specific information.   The identification of a unidirectional relation of ATM 
options leading stocks complements the finding that OTM options lead corporate 
bonds in displaying how an informed trader’s choice of options of different 
moneyness depends on the type of information she possesses.  If she has some mild 
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information, she will trade in at-the-money options; however, if she has some extreme 
information, she will trade in deep out-of-the-money options.  This finding contributes 
to a strand of literature on how information based trading in the option market is 
allocated across strike prices [De Jong, Koedijk, and Schnitzlein (2001), Kaul, 
Nimalendran and Zhang (2002), Anand and Chakravarty (2003), Chakravarty, Gulen, 
Mayhew (2004)]. 
 
Infrequent Trading and the Lead-Lag Relationships 
 
In this section, the panel VAR model is re-estimated based on data for all 77 
firms to examine whether the results in the previous section are subject to infrequent 
trading in corporate bonds.  As shown by Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, firms with inactive 
bonds tend to be smaller than firms with active bonds.  Reinserting those small firms 
and examining the pairwise lead-lag effects allows us to see whether an informed 
trader’s  choice to trade high-yield corporate bonds depends on the issuer’s size, and 
how the dynamics of information flow across different securities varies with firm size.  
The results are presented in Table 1.7 through Table 1.10. 
 
Stock returns are still positively correlated with contemporaneous bond returns 
at 0.143.  The explanatory power of past bond returns remains, with j−,12β  estimated at 
0.0403, 0.0852 and 0.0362 respectively for j=1, 2, and 3.  All estimates are statistically 
significant at 5% level except for that of time t-3, which is significant at 10%.  In 
addition, Granger causality tests confirm additional predictive power added by lagged 
bond returns, with an F-value of 3.8959, which is significant at 1% level.  Since higher  
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Table 1.7: Regression of current stock returns on current default-free debt 
returns, market returns, lagged bond returns, lagged ATM put option spreads, 
and lagged deep OTM put option spreads for the 77 firms with frequently traded 
bonds 
 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
 Variable Est. t-value p-value 
1 Constant 0.0002 2.4229 0.0154 
2 DR -0.0063 -1.1805 0.2379 
3 MR 0.0173 32.7755 0.0000 
4 SR{1} 0.0027 16.2631 0.0000 
5 SR{2} 0.0026 -0.8512 0.3947 
6 SR{3} 0.0011 -1.6758 0.0938 
7 SR{4} 0.0012 -1.6556 0.0978 
8 SR{5} 0.0022 1.8647 0.0623 
9 BR{1} 0.0010 1.9932 0.0463 
10 BR{2} -0.0015 4.1436 0.0000 
11 BR{3} -0.0012 1.7636 0.0779 
12 BR{4} -0.0011 1.4180 0.1563 
13 BR{5} -0.0043 0.2297 0.8183 
14 AS{1} 0.0001 -2.5685 0.0102 
15 AS{2} -0.0002 0.3814 0.7029 
16 AS{3} 0.0002 1.2717 0.2035 
17 AS{4} 0.0001 1.1099 0.2671 
18 AS{5} 0.0001 -0.2296 0.8184 
19 OS{1} 1.0105 -0.8147 0.4153 
20 OS{2} -0.3567 -0.0297 0.9763 
21 OS{3} 0.3430 0.3230 0.7467 
22 OS{4} -0.1318 -0.3703 0.7112 
23 OS{5} 0.1241 0.3702 0.7112 
24 Adj R-Square 0.1635   
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Table 1.7 (Continued) 
Panel B: Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis : 
The Following Coefficients Are Zero F-value p-value 
BR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 3.8959 0.0016 
AS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 2.4465 0.0318 
OS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 0.9664 0.4368 
 
Panel A presents the results from estimating the following model: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = =
−−−−−−−− +++++++=
5
1
5
1
5
1
5
1
,1,,14,,13,,12,,11,12111,
j j j j
tijtijjtijjtijjtijtitti OSASBRSRDRMRSR εββββγγα
 
SR and BR represent daily stock return and bond return, calculated from end-of-day 
closing prices.  MR is the S&P 500 index return, and DR denotes return on a default-
free debt with future cash flows matched perfectly with the high-yield corporate bond.  
AS and OS stand for ATM put options spreads and OTM put options spreads 
respectively.  They are normalized by dividing the bid-ask spreads by the average of 
bid and ask quotes.  Panel B contains the results from Granger Causality tests on 
whether all 12β , 13β , and 14β  are equal to zero. 
 
frequency of trading in stocks as compared to bonds tends to introduce a spurious 
stock lead, the fact that the predictive ability of previous bond returns for present stock 
prices changes remains even for firms with inactive bonds makes my results very 
strong.     
 
The fact that investors might choose to trade on their private information in the 
corporate bond market has important implications for surveillance for illegal insider 
trading in this market.  While this study does not investigate whether corporate bond 
traders are trading on insider information unlawfully or aim at establishing a breach of 
fiduciary duty, it is likely that some of the information that informed traders exploit is  
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Table 1.8: Regression of current bond returns on current default-free debt 
returns, market returns, lagged bond returns, lagged ATM put option spreads, 
and lagged deep OTM put option spreads for the 77 firms with frequently traded 
bonds 
 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
 Variable Est. t-value p-value 
1 Constant 0.0015 3.4360 0.0006 
2 DR 0.0526 0.9864 0.3240 
3 MR 0.1080 4.4177 0.0000 
4 SR{1} 0.1411 20.3171 0.0000 
5 SR{2} 0.0892 12.4718 0.0000 
6 SR{3} 0.0478 6.6383 0.0000 
7 SR{4} 0.0266 3.7420 0.0002 
8 SR{5} 0.0182 2.5735 0.0101 
9 BR{1} -0.3066 -24.7193 0.0000 
10 BR{2} -0.1533 -11.9384 0.0000 
11 BR{3} -0.0904 -7.0384 0.0000 
12 BR{4} -0.0684 -5.4452 0.0000 
13 BR{5} -0.0634 -5.4190 0.0000 
14 AS{1} -0.0006 -0.9544 0.3399 
15 AS{2} 0.0006 0.7225 0.4700 
16 AS{3} -0.0001 -0.0923 0.9265 
17 AS{4} -0.0002 -0.3188 0.7499 
18 AS{5} 0.0007 1.1363 0.2559 
19 OS{1} -0.0370 -0.9886 0.3229 
20 OS{2} -0.0328 -0.7870 0.4313 
21 OS{3} 0.0339 0.8120 0.4168 
22 OS{4} 0.0369 0.8881 0.3745 
23 OS{5} -0.0270 -0.7188 0.4723 
24 Adj R-Square 0.1520   
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Table 1.8 (Continued) 
Panel B: Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis : 
The Following Coefficients Are Zero F-value p-value 
SR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 132.1312 0.0000 
AS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 0.5083 0.7702 
OS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 2.2486 0.0468 
 
Panel A presents the results from estimating the following model: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = =
−−−−−−−− +++++++=
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1
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,2,,24,,23,,22,,21,22212,
j j j j
tijtijjtijjtijjtijtitti OSASBRSRDRMRBR εββββγγα
SR and BR represent daily stock return and bond return, calculated from end-of-day 
closing prices.  MR is the S&P 500 index return, and DR denotes return on a default-
free debt with future cash flows matched perfectly with the high-yield corporate bond.  
AS and OS stand for ATM put options spreads and OTM put options spreads 
respectively.  They are normalized by dividing the bid-ask spreads by the average of 
bid and ask quotes.  Panel B contains the results from Granger Causality tests on 
whether all 21β , 23β , and 24β  are equal to zero.  
 
illegal in nature.  If prices of corporate bonds are sensitive to private information and 
the market for corporate bonds, especially high-yield bonds, includes some insider 
trading, then the concerns about insider trading as in any other securities market apply. 
It might be optimal for both policymakers and regulators to devote more efforts in 
monitoring the corporate bond market. 
 
As to the relationships between the option market and the other two markets, 
ATM put option spreads continue to lead stock returns.  The hypothesis that current 
stock returns have predictive power for future ATM put spread changes can be easily 
rejected, with an F-value of 0.3838 (Table 1.9).  The hypothesis on the ATM option  
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Table 1.9: Regression of current ATM put option spreads on current default-free 
debt returns, market returns, lagged bond returns, lagged ATM put option 
spreads, and lagged deep OTM put option spreads for the 77 firms with 
frequently traded bonds 
 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
 Variable Est. t-value p-value 
1 Constant 0.0569 9.6685 0.0000 
2 DR -0.3933 -0.4239 0.6717 
3 MR 1.2400 2.8338 0.0046 
4 SR{1} -0.1203 -0.9023 0.3669 
5 SR{2} -0.0313 -0.2067 0.8362 
6 SR{3} 0.0283 0.1827 0.8551 
7 SR{4} -0.1169 -0.7831 0.4336 
8 SR{5} 0.0013 0.0098 0.9922 
9 BR{1} 0.1094 0.4638 0.6428 
10 BR{2} 0.3585 1.5203 0.1285 
11 BR{3} 0.0393 0.1631 0.8705 
12 BR{4} 0.5490 2.3615 0.0182 
13 BR{5} -0.0169 -0.0759 0.9395 
14 AS{1} 1.0248 82.2767 0.0000 
15 AS{2} -0.3623 -20.3270 0.0000 
16 AS{3} 0.2106 11.5677 0.0000 
17 AS{4} -0.0867 -4.8554 0.0000 
18 AS{5} 0.0540 4.3073 0.0000 
19 OS{1} -0.3204 -0.4508 0.6522 
20 OS{2} 0.2860 0.2938 0.7689 
21 OS{3} 0.6454 0.6672 0.5047 
22 OS{4} -0.7887 -0.8109 0.4175 
23 OS{5} 0.9964 1.3938 0.1634 
24 Adjusted R-
Square 
0.4870   
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Table 1.9 (Continued) 
Panel B: Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis : 
The Following Coefficients Are Zero F-value p-value 
SR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 0.3838 0.8602 
BR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 1.4924 0.1887 
OS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 6.8842 0.0000 
 
Panel A presents the results from estimating the following model: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = =
−−−−−−−− +++++++=
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tijtijjtijjtijjtijtitti OSASBRSRDRMRAS εββββγγα
 
SR and BR represent daily stock return and bond return, calculated from end-of-day 
closing prices.  MR is the S&P 500 index return, and DR denotes return on a default-
free debt with future cash flows matched perfectly with the high-yield corporate bond.  
AS and OS stand for ATM put options spreads and OTM put options spreads 
respectively.  They are normalized by dividing the bid-ask spreads by the average of 
bid and ask quotes. Panel B contains the results from Granger Causality tests on 
whether all 31β , 32β , and 34β  are equal to zero.  
 
 
lead in the stock-option relationship, however, can not be rejected (Table 1.7).  
Furthermore, the result concerning the correlation between present bond returns and 
earlier OTM option spreads is robust even when infrequently traded bonds are 
considered.  Table 8 shows lagged deep OTM options spreads contain valuable 
information about current bond price changes, with Granger causality test rejecting the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients for ASt-1 through ASt-5 are zero at 1% level.  
However, none of the lagged bond returns are significant in explaining current OTM 
option spreads, making my conclusion on the option’s lead even stronger.   
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Table 1.10: Regression of current OTM put option spreads on current default-
free debt returns, market returns, lagged bond returns, lagged ATM put option 
spreads, and lagged deep OTM put option spreads for the 77 firms with 
frequently traded bonds 
 
Panel A: Estimation Results 
 Variable Est. t-value p-value 
1 Constant 0.0002 2.0052 0.0450 
2 DR -0.0063 -0.4008 0.6886 
3 MR 0.0173 2.3276 0.0200 
4 SR{1} 0.0027 1.1858 0.2357 
5 SR{2} 0.0026 0.9656 0.3343 
6 SR{3} 0.0011 0.3900 0.6965 
7 SR{4} 0.0012 0.4531 0.6505 
8 SR{5} 0.0022 0.9273 0.3538 
9 BR{1} 0.0010 0.2433 0.8078 
10 BR{2} -0.0015 -0.3609 0.7182 
11 BR{3} -0.0012 -0.2816 0.7783 
12 BR{4} -0.0011 -0.2635 0.7921 
13 BR{5} -0.0043 -1.1234 0.2613 
14 AS{1} 0.0001 0.2492 0.8032 
15 AS{2} -0.0002 -0.5366 0.5916 
16 AS{3} 0.0002 0.7155 0.4743 
17 AS{4} 0.0001 0.1883 0.8507 
18 AS{5} 0.0001 0.2418 0.8089 
19 OS{1} 1.0105 82.1563 0.0000 
20 OS{2} -0.3567 -20.4802 0.0000 
21 OS{3} 0.3430 19.7159 0.0000 
22 OS{4} -0.1318 -7.5642 0.0000 
23 OS{5} 0.1241 10.0197 0.0000 
24 Adj. R-Square 0.9230   
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Table 1.10 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis : 
The Following Coefficients Are Zero F-value 
Significance 
Level 
SR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 1.4603 0.1993 
BR: Lag 1 to Lag 5 0.3573 0.8778 
AS: Lag 1 to Lag 5 0.8832 0.4913 
 
Panel A presents the results from estimating the following model: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = =
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SR and BR represent daily stock return and bond return, calculated from end-of-day 
closing prices.  MR is the S&P 500 index return, and DR denotes return on a default-
free debt with future cash flows matched perfectly with the high-yield corporate bond.  
AS and OS stand for ATM put options spreads and OTM put options spreads 
respectively.  They are normalized by dividing the bid-ask spreads by the average of 
bid and ask quotes.  Panel B contains the results from Granger Causality tests on 
whether all 41β , 42β , and 43β  are equal to zero.  
 
Conclusions and Extensions  
 
Taking advantage of a unique corporate bond transaction dataset from NASD, 
this paper studies whether information-based trading takes place in the high-yield 
corporate bond market, and how firm-specific information flow across three important 
securities, stocks, options and corporate bonds, whose value is related to the issuer’s 
underlying assets.  In contrast to previous studies [Kwan (1996), Hotchkiss and Ronen 
(2002)], I find that informed traders do trade in the corporate bond market, and 
corporate bond returns contain important information about future stock price 
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movements.  Both the stock market and the bond market serve important 
informational roles in the price discovery process.  Furthermore, compared to the 
stock and the bond markets, the option market is a preferred venue for informed 
trading.  It is leading both the stock market and the corporate bond markets in 
reflecting firm specific information.  In addition, there is strong evidence that an 
informed trader’s choice of options with different strike prices depends crucially on 
what kind of information she has.  Unless she is aware of some impending extreme 
event to a firm, in which case she rushes to buy deep OTM put options on the firm, 
she will trade ATM options if she obtains milder information. 
    
The analysis of the dynamics of information flow across individual stocks, 
options and corporate bonds can be extended in several important ways.  First, it is 
interesting to extend this study in both cross-sectional and time-series frameworks.  
What this study establishes is a world with asymmetric information arrival, with the 
option market leading the others.  It would be interesting to know whether this 
relationship extends to each individual firm, and if not, how it varies with firm-
specific characteristics.    Furthermore, how the relative speed of adjustment to new 
information in different markets changes with contemporaneous market conditions and 
over time, and whether it differs dramatically between event days and non-event days 
are of no less interest.  Answers to these questions will provide deeper understanding 
of the price discovery process.  An example of work in this direction is Chakravarty, 
Gulen and Mayhew (2004).  
 
Second, as this study focuses on the lead-lag interrelationships between three 
closely related securities markets in terms of price, it is equally important to explore 
the information role of volume.  Easley and O’Hara (1992) show that volume contains 
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some information that is not reflected in the price.  Blume, Easley and O’Hara (1994) 
emphasize the role of volume as a statistic for technical analysis.  It is interesting to 
check whether transaction volume in different markets provides additional insights 
into where informed traders trade and where price discovery takes place.  
Furthermore, an investigation of the pattern of trading volume in corporate bonds and 
its time-series variation would contribute to the new area of corporate bond market 
microstructure.  
 
Third, the identification of informed trading in the high-yield bond market 
suggests a market microstructure approach to corporate bond pricing.  Traditional 
models of default, including both option-based structural models and reduced form 
models, have had limited success in explaining the corporate yield spreads observed in 
actual markets.  Even after accounting for liquidity effects, it is still challenging to 
explain credit spread changes solely based on credit-risk factors [see for example, 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Eom, Helwege and Huang (2003), 
Duffie and Singleton (2003) and Huang and Huang (2003)].  One inherent assumption 
under all these models, however, is that the market is complete.  If information is 
asymmetric, then informed traders are better able to adjust their portfolio to 
incorporate new information, putting uninformed traders at a disadvantage.  In 
equilibrium, investors require higher yield to hold bonds with greater information-
based trading.  This suggests that in addition to traditional corporate bond pricing 
factors, risks associated with informed trading are also priced in corporate bonds.  The 
high-yield spreads observed in the market might embed an information premium that 
is ignored by existing corporate bond pricing models, and correct pricing of 
information risk in the corporate bond market brings a more ambitious goal into 
research agenda. 
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Lastly, as posited by Titman (2002), if the markets for debt, equity and 
derivatives are not integrated, then the required return premium associated with any 
risk differs across markets.  This directly affects how firms raise capital and hedge.  
The complete transaction dataset for debt, equity and derivative securities, as well as 
an accurate pricing model for different risks, allow direct tests of whether the markets 
for these securities are perfectly integrated, and hence help us to gain a deeper 
understanding of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 INFORMATION, LIQUIDITY AND CORPORATE YIELD SPREADS 
 
Introduction 
 
Traditional structural models of default risk, built on the original insights of 
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), provide an intuitive framework for 
identifying the determinants of yield spread of risky debt securities. According to 
Merton (1974), corporate debt can be valued as a portfolio comprised of similar risk 
free debt and a short position in a put option on the issuer’s assets. This option-based 
approach has been extended in numerous theoretical studie19 to incorporate realistic 
economic considerations. For example, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) propose a 
tractable model which incorporates both default risk and interest rate risk and allows 
for deviations from strict absolute priority. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and 
Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) factor strategic debt service into the premium on 
risky corporate debt. Leland and Toft (1996) relax the assumption of the exogenously–
determined default boundaries, and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) improve on 
the structural approach by allowing the firms to adjust their capital structure to reflect 
changes in asset value. 
 
Despite the richness of this structural paradigm, practical applications have 
been disappointing. Several empirical analyses [see for example, Jones, Mason and 
                                                 
19 See Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Black and Cox (1976), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), 
Duffie and Lando (2001), Geske (1977), Ingersoll (1977), Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), 
Leland (1994, 1998), Leland and Toft (1996), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Mella-Barral and 
Perraudin (1997) and Zhou (2001). 
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Rosenfeld (1984)] have shown that the Corporate-Treasury yield spreads generated by 
the original Merton (1974) model are significantly below those observed in the 
market. Additionally, tests of other structural models have not yet reached any 
consensus on the ability of these models to explain the observed corporate yield 
spreads [see Anderson and Sundaresan (2000), Lyden and Saraniti (2000) and Eom, 
Helwege and Huang (2002)]. Instead, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) 
find that variables that should theoretically determine credit spread changes actually 
have rather limited explanatory power. Furthermore, they identify a ‘single common 
factor’ that drives most of the changes in yield spreads. This common factor, however, 
can not be explained by any macroeconomic or financial variables in their study. 
Moreover, Huang and Huang (2003) conclude that credit risk accounts for only part of 
the observed Corporate-Treasury yield spreads, leaving the rest again unexplained 
within the structural framework of credit risk valuation. 
 
Instead of modeling credit risks on the variability of the firm’s asset value as in 
the structural framework, an alternative approach would be reduced form models20, 
which value risky bonds by discounting certainty equivalent cash flows at risk free 
rates. Therefore, the value of a risky bond is directly linked to the default risk and the 
recovery rate in the event of default, both of which are assumed to be stochastic and 
exogenous to the model. Compared to structural models, reduced form models are 
more flexible, and mathematically more tractable. Furthermore, they incorporate 
several factors other than default risk, such as illiquidity and state taxes, into the 
stochastic default risk process. However, these models are still unable to fully 
rationalize actual corporate yield spreads.  The unsatisfactory performance of these 
                                                 
20 See Duffee (1999), Duffie and Singleton (1997, 1999), Das and Tufano (1996), Elton, Gruber, 
Agrawal and Mann (2001), Lando (1997), Madan and Unal (1998, 2000), Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull 
(1997), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). 
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two basic approaches underscores the weakness of our understanding of corporate 
bond price behavior. 
 
I will argue in this paper that corporate bond market microstructure factors, 
including information and liquidity, affect corporate bond yield spreads.  Consistent 
with Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2006), I find that liquidity is an important factor in 
determining yield spread of risky corporate bonds. But perhaps more important, I also 
find that the degree of asymmetric information in individual bonds contains significant 
additional power in explaining corporate yield spreads. This finding suggests that 
actual corporate yield spreads may incorporate both an information premium and a 
liquidity premium that are ignored by traditional corporate bond pricing models. It 
also confirms the general argument made by O’Hara in her 2003 American Finance 
Association (AFA) Presidential Address regarding the implications of market 
microstructure for asset pricing: “Markets provide two important functions—liquidity 
and price discovery….  Asset pricing models need to be recast in broader terms to 
incorporate the transaction costs of liquidity and the risks of price discovery.”21 
 
Several authors have noted that the relative liquidities of corporate and 
Treasury bonds, and the role of liquidity in the pricing of corporate debt has been 
explored in a host of recent studies.22 Since illiquidity prevents investors from 
                                                 
21 See O’Hara (2003), Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery, Journal of Finance 58, page 
1335. 
22 The role of liquidity in the pricing of equity securities has been studied extensively in the literature on 
the implications of market microstructure for asset pricing. See for example, Amihud (2002), Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986, 1988), Acharya and Pedersen (2004), Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993), Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Chalmers and Kadlec 
(1998), Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Haugen and Baker (1996), Chordia, Subrahmanyam 
and Anshuman (2001), Pastor and Stambaugh (2001), Vayanos (2004) and Hasbrouck (2005).  
Liquidity in the Treasury markets has also been the topic of numerous studies. See for example, Sarig 
and Warga (1989), Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Warga (1992), Daves and Ehrhardt (1993), Kamara 
(1994), Elton and Green (1998), Fleming (2002, 2003), Strebulaev (2002), Krishnamurthy (2002) and 
Goldreich, Hanke and Nathy (2004). 
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continuously hedging their risks, a liquidity premium is required for compensation. 
Because secondary corporate bond transactions take place in the over-the-counter 
(OTC) market, meaningful quote data is difficult to obtain, making it impossible to 
directly calculate reliable measures of liquidity, such as the bid-ask spread. 
Furthermore, quality bond transaction data did not exist before the introduction of the 
Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE)23 by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD). Because of this, empirical research in this area has relied 
on indirect liquidity measures,24 including the total amount of a bond issue 
[Alexander, Edwards and Ferri (2000) and Hong and Warga (2000)], coupon rate 
[Gehr and Martell (1992)], whether the issuer’s equity is publicly traded [Alexander, 
Edwards and Ferri (2000)], age of a bond [Alexander, Edwards and Ferri (2000), 
Hong and Warga (2000) and Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2002)], price 
volatility of a bond [Alexander, Edwards and Ferri (2000) and Hong and Warga 
(2000)] and number of market participants quoting the bond [Gehr and Martell 
(1992)].25 Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2003) propose two additional measures: the 
occurrence of ‘price runs’26 or missing values, and the dispersion of yields quoted 
from different sources27. They show that all of these measures account for some 
portion of the yield spread changes. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) 
quantify liquidity effects by using the spread between on- and off-the-run Treasuries, 
swap spreads and the frequency of quotes versus matrix prices in the Warga database. 
Furthermore, Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2004) use the time-series average of the bid-
                                                 
23 For a detailed description of the TRACE system, see Zhou (2005a). 
24 In the reduced form approach, liquidity is not modeled specifically to explain corporate yield spreads. 
Instead, it is subsumed into the stochastic default risk process.  Duffee (1999) simply argues that the 
unexplained part of yields spreads is liquidity based. 
25 For a more complete literature overview of liquidity measures from the empirical bond liquidity 
literature and their effects on the bond yield, see Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2003). 
26 ‘Price Run’ occurs when two consecutive prices for a bond are identical. See Sarig and Warga 
(1989).  
27 For a detailed description of how to calculate the yield dispersion, see Houweling, Mentink and Vorst 
(2003). 
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ask spread reported by Bloomberg, time to maturity of a bond, and dummy variables 
for bonds issued by financial firms and for bonds issued by highly-rated firms 
respectively. Chen Lesmond and Wei (2006) uses quarterly bid ask quotes from 
Bloomberg, as well as percentage of zero return and another liquidity proxy derived 
from Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999). These proxies are demonstrated to be 
strongly related to the nondefault component of yield spreads28. 
 
While these different liquidity measures provide more insight into the 
determinants of yield spread changes, their added explanatory power is rather limited. 
Moreover, as almost all of these measures investigate the cross-sectional variation in 
liquidity or liquidity changes at the aggregate level, little is known about how the 
time-variation in corporate bond liquidity affects yield spreads on an individual basis. 
Taking advantage of a recent corporate bond transaction data set from the NASD, I 
use the number of transactions (NOT) and price impact [Amihud (2002)] to measure 
the liquidity of individual corporate bonds. I find that over time, a low-grade corporate 
bond’s liquidity has significant effects on its yield spread. A one-standard-deviation 
drop in NOT leads to a widening of the yield spread by more than 13 basis points, and 
a one-standard deviation increase in price impact raises the yield spread by 52 basis 
points.  This is consistent with previous studies on the liquidity effects on bond yields, 
and suggests an important liquidity dimension to corporate yield spreads. 
 
Compared to the extensive literature on liquidity effects in asset pricing, 
research on information risk as a determinant of asset returns is still in its infancy. 
                                                 
28 Other studies have investigated the exposure of corporate bond returns to liquidity shocks in related 
markets. De Jong and Driessen (2004) show that corporate bond returns are closely related to changes 
in the equity market liquidity and Treasury market liquidity. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and 
Weinbaum (2004) look at the liquidity of the market for related individual options and find that the 
liquidity of the firm’s traded options have a significant liquidity-spillover effect on the firm’s short-
maturity corporate bonds.  
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During the process of new information becoming incorporated into market prices, the 
informational advantage of informed traders creates risks for uninformed traders as 
they constantly lose to the informed ones in the sense that they always end up with 
portfolios that invest too much in bad assets and too little in good ones. In order for 
investors to hold securities about which they are uninformed, an information risk 
premium is required. In a theoretical paper, Easley and O’Hara (2004) develop an 
asymmetric information asset pricing model and show that a firm’s information 
structure has substantial effects on its cost of capital. An empirical application of this 
model to the equity market is provided by Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2004). 
Consistent with the prediction of the Easley and O’Hara (2004) model, they find that 
stocks with more private information and less public information have a higher excess 
return, all else being equal. Specifically, they identify a 2.5 percent difference in 
expected annual returns for two stocks with a difference of 10 percentage points in 
their proxy for information asymmetry, the probability of information-based trading 
(PIN)29. Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2004) further confirm the information risk 
premium in stock returns. After forming composite zero-investment portfolios by 
taking long positions in high PIN stocks and short positions in low PIN stocks of equal 
size, they show that these portfolios earn significant excess returns, which cannot be 
explained by the Fama-French or momentum factors. The conclusion that stock 
returns embed an information risk premium has also been reached by Burlacu, 
Fontaine and Jimenez-Garces (2005). 
 
This paper extends the literature on the implications of market microstructure 
for asset pricing to corporate debt securities and investigates whether corporate yield 
spreads observed in the market embed an information risk premium. There has been 
                                                 
29 For PIN estimation details, see Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997). 
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substantial anecdotal evidence that information-based trading takes place in the 
corporate bond market. In the late 1980s, investigations by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office revealed the occurrence 
of insider trading in the junk bond market by Michael Milken, the “king of junk 
bonds”. In 2000, Donald Trump quietly spent $46 million buying bonds issued by 
Trump Hotels and Casino Resorts while he threatened to stop payment of interest to 
investors in his bonds.30 Furthermore, in 1998, former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt 
stated that the SEC has “found anecdotal evidence of the possible misuse of inside 
information in the high-yield (debt) market.”31 
 
Several studies in market microstructure literature also provide strong 
empirical evidence of information-based trading in corporate debt securities. Datta and 
Datta (1996) argue that the absence of any reporting requirement for insider bond 
transactions may create an enhanced opportunity for insiders to exploit private 
information to expropriate wealth from uninformed bond traders. In a companion 
paper [Zhou (2005a)], I find that current high-yield bond returns have explanatory 
power for future stock price changes, suggesting that the corporate bond market serves 
an important role in the price discovery process. The fact that some bond traders 
posses superior information related to the value of corporate bonds, and hence might 
take advantage of this private information at the expense of uninformed traders 
suggests that bond holders require compensation for bearing the asymmetric 
information risk. Using a transaction-based asymmetric information measure (AIM) 
for individual corporate bonds, I find that yield spreads of high-yield corporate bonds 
are significantly affected by changes in the degree of information asymmetry, even 
                                                 
30 The Wall Street Journal, 10/31/2001. 
31 See speech by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt: “The Importance of Transparency in America’s 
Debt Market”, at the Media Studies Center, New York, N.Y., on September 9th, 1998. 
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after accounting for effects of liquidity and other traditional corporate bond pricing 
factors. A one-standard-deviation jump in the AIM measure of a corporate bond 
causes the bond’s yield spread to increase by 71 basis points. Furthermore, the AIM 
measure itself explains about 10% of the changes in yield spreads. The strong 
evidence of information and liquidity components in the corporate yield spreads 
provides insight into the credit spread puzzle. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.1 describes the AIM 
measure, which is derived from an asymmetric information asset pricing model, 
followed by empirical specifications of this measure for corporate bonds. Section 2.2 
describes the data used for this study with special emphasis on corporate bond 
transaction data from the NASD’s TRACE system. Section 2.3 contains summary 
descriptions of the results from estimating the private information content of 
individual corporate bonds. In section 2.4, I empirically test whether corporate yield 
spreads are related to the level of asymmetric information and liquidity of individual 
bonds. Various robustness checks are performed in section 2.5.  I conclude my 
arguments in section 2.6. 
 
The Asymmetric Information Measure and its Empirical Specifications for 
Corporate Bonds 
 
Private information content of common stocks has been of extreme interest to both 
academics and financial practitioners, and several approaches have been suggested for 
its measurement.  These approaches could be classified into two categories: informal 
measures and formal microstructure model based measures.  Informal asymmetric 
information measures include measures related to financial analysts, such as the forest 
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error or the forecast dispersion [Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998), Gilson et al. 
(1998), D’ Mello and Ferris (2000)], and the number of following financial analysts 
[Brennan and Hughes (1991), Brennan et al. (1993), Elton, Gruber and Gultekin 
(1984)], the market-to-book ratio or the price earning ratio [Smith and Watts (1992), 
McLaughlin et. al. (1998)], and the firm-specific return variation [Bhagat et al. (1985), 
Blackwell et al. (1990), Clark and Shastri (2001), Van Ness et al. (2001).  However, 
empirical studies show that these informal measures present significant drawbacks.  
For example, Easley, O’Hara and Paperman (1998) examine the relationship between 
analyst coverage and their PIN (probability of informed trading) measure.  They find 
that the number of financial analysts is not a good proxy for information-based 
trading. Similar conclusions are reached by Chung et al. (1995), Clarke and Shastri 
(2001) and Van Ness et al. (2002). Clarke and Shastri (2001) and Van Ness et al. 
(2001) also cast some doubts on using the market-to-book ratio or the price earning 
ratio to measure private information as they find that these two measures have non-
significant and sometimes even negative, correlations with several alternative 
information asymmetry measures. Similarly, using the firm-specific return variation as 
a proxy for the degree of information-based trading is also very controversial.  Morck 
et al. (2000) and Drunev (2004) argue high specific return variations are often related 
to a more informative price. Hence the correlation between return variations and the 
degree of private information is negative, inconsistent with the argument that firms 
with high return variations tend to be more risky, less known by the market and the 
degree of private information is higher.  
 
A second group of measures are derived from theoretical microstructure models, 
which include the informational component of bid-ask spreads and the PIN.  As other 
informal measures, they have also received various critics from the financial literature.  
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O’Hara (1995) declares that it is difficult to distinguish between the transitory and 
informational component of the bid-ask spread. This argument has been supported by 
several empirical studies.  The estimated information components range from about 
10% of the total bid-ask spread [George et al (1991) ] up to 40% [Madhavan (1997)].  
Neal and Wheatley (1998) and Van Ness et al. (2001) concludes that the informational 
component of spreads is rather a noisy transformation of the total bid-ask spread and 
hence, these microstructure measures are poorly specified for measuring a security’s 
degree of information asymmetry. 
 
Another widely accepted formal measure is the PIN measure, which is proposed 
and extended in a series of theoretical and empirical papers by Easley and O’Hara and 
their coauthors.  They show that the PIN measure has significant effects on stock 
returns and its effects dominate those of other traditional factors.  This measure has 
received extensive support since its publication.  It has been shown to be strongly 
related to the specific stock return variations [Durnev et al. (2004)], the bid-ask spread 
[Chung and Li (2003)] and the cost of capital [Botosan and Plumlee (2003)].   
However, due to data limitations, estimating the PIN for corporate bonds turns out to 
be extremely difficult. 
  
 This paper employs an alternative approach which measures information 
asymmetry from transaction data, instead of quotes data. Burlacu et al (2005) is the 
first to apply this approach in the equity securities.  Using CRSP US daily stock data 
for about 7,000 stocks over 17 years, they find that this AIM measure has a strong 
impact on stock returns and dominates traditional asset pricing factors such as β  and 
the Fama and French factors.  
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The AIM measure is obtained directly from a Rational Expectations (RE) model 
with multiple securities and many sources of uncertainty. This model is essentially a 
generalization of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model, which focuses on an 
economy where some investors are more informed on the future distributions of a 
security’s returns than others.  Intuitively, if the market is noisy, price of a security 
contains some private information about future returns.  Since this part of private 
information is not revealed by prices, it is related to future returns.  The AIM measure 
employed in this paper basically uses the degree of correlation between current 
security prices and future returns as a measure of the private information embedded in 
the security.  
 
The Model 
 
Consider an economy with information asymmetry. Investors trade N risky 
securities and one risk-free security at time 0, and consume at time 1 when these 
securities pay off. The pay-off (liquidation value) of risky security i is generated by 
one specific and K common factors as follows: 
 
(2.1) i
K
k
kkiiip εθβμ ++= ∑
=1
,
1 , 
 
where 1ip  is the payoff of risky security i, iμ  and kθ  represent the specific and 
common factors respectively, ki ,β  denotes the factor loading to the common factor k 
for security i, and iε  is the error term. The realization of the specific and common 
factors is known toλ  percent of the investors, known as informed traders, at time 0, 
while the remaining investors only know that these factors are independent random 
variables and have normal distributions. Investors are constant absolute risk averse, 
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and they trade to maximize their utility at time 1: 
 
(2.2) ( ) 11 jIj eIU α−−= , 
 
where 1jI  is investor j’s income at time 1, and α  denotes the risk aversion coefficient 
for investor j. The per capita supply of security i is assumed to be an independent 
random variable iz , which is normally distributed. The supply iz  is unknown by both 
the informed and uninformed investors. 
 
For expositional convenience, I drop the subscript for each random variable 
and obtain random vectors. Specifically, let 
 
(2.3) [ ]′= NppppP ...321 , 
 
(2.4) 
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(2.5) [ ]′=Θ KN θθθμμμ ...... 2121 , 
 
(2.6) [ ]′=Ε Nεεεε ...321 , 
 
(2.7) and [ ]′= NzzzzZ ...321 . 
 
Thus, the N-vector of securities’ payoff at time 1 thus can be written as 
 
(2.8) EBP +Θ=1 , 
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where Θ  is the (N+K) dimensional vector containing both N common factors and K 
specific factors, and B is the (N, N+K) block matrix obtained by joining the N 
dimensional identity matrix with  the matrix of asset factor loadings. Without loss of 
generality, it is assumed the expected values and variance-covariance matrices for Θ , 
E  and Z are Θ  , 0, Z , and ΘΩ  , εΩ  and zΩ , respectively. All variance-covariance 
matrices are further assumed to be regular. 
 
Under certain regularity conditions, it is not difficulty to show that when some 
investors possess superior information about future price movements, there exists a 
unique equilibrium in which current equilibrium securities prices are linear functions 
of the informed investors’ private information Θ  and asset supplies Z  at time 1: 
 
(2.9) ZAAAP 210
0 −Θ+=  
 
where 210 , AAA，  are the coefficient matrices.  Since the supplies Z are unknown to 
both informed and uninformed investors, the uninformed investors are not able to infer 
the realization of Θ  from current securities prices. Therefore, part of the private 
information remains in the hands of informed investors.  Since ,1 EBP +Θ=  the 
equilibrium price at time 0 also suggests that the total amount of uncertainty about 
future price movements, measured by ( )01var PP − , is determined by uncertainty 
related to pricing factors ( ΘΩ ), pricing noise ( εΩ ) and per capita asset supply ( zΩ ). 
As part of informed traders’ private information is incorporated into prices through 
trading, observing current security prices helps to reduce the uncertainty about future 
price changes to ( )001var PPP − , which is determined by the remaining uncertainty 
about the pricing factors after prices are known to the market ( 0PΘΩ ), and εΩ and zΩ . 
Therefore, the drop in the volatility in future price changes from  ( )01var PP −  to 
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( )001var PPP −   is solely attributed to the reduction from ΘΩ  to 0PΘΩ , which, in turn, 
is caused by the information asymmetry between information and uninformed traders. 
Since more aggressive trading on private information results in more information 
revealed by prices, and hence smaller uncertainty about future price movements, the 
difference between ΘΩ and 0PΘΩ  could be used to suggest a measure for the degree of 
information asymmetry during the trading process. Specifically, the degree of 
information asymmetry for security i at time 0 is defined as the amount of private 
information that is unrevealed by current prices of all existing securities ( 0PΘΩ ), 
relative to the total amount of initial private information ( ΘΩ ). As the difference 
between ΘΩ and 0PΘΩ  can not be directly estimated from market data, I used the 
difference between ( )01var PP − and ( )001var PPP − as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. The amount of unrevealed private information can be calculated 
as )()( 00101 PPPVarPPVar
iiii −−− , while the total amount of initial private information 
can be estimated by )( 01
ii PPVar − . Therefore, the asymmetric information measure for 
security i can be expressed a 
 
(2.10) .
)(
)(
1
01
001
ii
ii
i
PPVar
PPPVar
AIM −
−−=  
 
The idea behind this method is quite straightforward.  In an economy where 
everyone possesses the same information about security i and the information is 
processed in the same way, in equilibrium, security prices contain no further 
information about future price movements. As a result, current security price levels are 
not correlated with future price changes, and hence are not useful in reducing 
associated uncertainties, i.e., )( 001 PPPVar
ii − = )( 01 ii PPVar −  and 0=iAIM . 
Conversely, in an economy with information asymmetry, part of the information about 
future price movements remain in the possession of informed traders.  Since this 
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private information is not revealed by prices, it conditions future price movements.  
Consequently, future security price changes will be dependent on current price levels. 
Therefore, current security prices are helpful in reducing uncertainties about future 
price changes, i.e. )( 001 PPPVar
ii − < )( 01 ii PPVar −  and 0>iAIM . Furthermore, the 
degree of dependence of future price changes on current price levels serves as a 
valuable measure of the amount of private information embedded in security prices. 
The more private information remains in the hands of informed traders, the smaller the 
conditional variance of future price changes and the higher the difference between 
)( 01
ii PPVar −  and )( 001 PPPVar ii − , and, hence the higher the iAIM . 
 
Empirical Specifications 
 
To implement this method in the corporate bond market, notice that the AIM 
measure is obtained by projecting one-period bond price changes on price levels at the 
beginning of the corresponding period. The resulting R2 from this regression is exactly 
the AIM derived from the RE model. Specifically, following Burlacu et al (2005), I 
use the next regression for the AIM estimation: 
 
(2.11) ∑
=
− ++=Δ
N
j
i
t
j
t
jiii
t PP
1
1
, εβα ,      
where itP 1−  denotes the price of bond i at the beginning of period t and 
 
(2.12) it
i
t
i
t PPP 1−−=Δ , 
 
represents bond i’s  price changes during period t. I take logarithms of corporate bond 
prices before I calculate price changes, since the logarithms of prices are closer to the 
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normality hypothesis. Furthermore, to ameliorate the econometric properties of the 
AIM, which is bounded in the [0,1] interval, I apply the following transformation to 
the original R2 to get the new AIM for bond i: 
 
(2.13) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−= 2
2
1
ln
i
ii
R
RAIM .                                   
In order to complete the empirical specification of the AIM, a decision needs 
to be made on what prices should be included in the above regression for a relevant 
extraction of information about future bond price movements. Theoretically, in a 
world where values of all securities are more or less related to each other, price 
changes of any bond i should be projected on the prices of all securities to get a full 
estimation of the AIM. This approach unfortunately is unfeasible in practice. Limited 
observations on corporate bonds preclude the use of a large number of securities as 
regressors. Therefore, this study includes a few related securities and a market index 
that have been suggested in the literature as important information sources for 
individual corporate bond price changes. 
 
Specifically, the information sources include the price of bond i, the price of 
the issuer’s common stock, the price of a corresponding default-free bond whose 
future cash flows perfectly match those of the target corporate bond, and the S&P 500 
index level. The rationale behind using the stock price as an information source is 
fairly simple. As a firm’s stock and bonds represent claims to the same underlying 
assets, information regarding the value of the assets will affect both the firm’s stock 
and bonds. Hence, if information-based trading takes place in the stock market, stock 
prices contain valuable information about future bond price movements. Empirical 
evidence of the predictive power of stock price on future bond price changes has been 
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documented in both Kwan (1996) and Zhou (2005a). Besides individual stock prices, I 
also include the S&P 500 index level to provide information about overall stock 
market conditions. Previous studies [see for example, Blume, Keim and Patel (1991) 
and Cornell and Green (1991)] have shown that high-yield corporate bonds are very 
sensitive to stock market movements. Finally, the price of a corresponding default-free 
bond with matching future cash flows is included to control for interest rate risk. The 
price of default-free bonds is obtained by discounting the cash flows of the 
corresponding corporate bond at default-free zero-coupon interest rates. These zero-
coupon rates are estimated by employing a modified version of the extended Nelson-
Siegel model [Bliss (1997)] on the observed on-the-run Treasury curve.32 
 
To test the robustness of my results, I propose several specifications for the 
AIM by increasing the number of information sources in the regression. In the 
simplest specification, besides the price of the target corporate bond, I include the 
price of the issuer’s common stock to capture firm-specific information gleaned from 
the issuer’s equity security: 
 
(2.14) it
i
t
sii
t
biii
t SPP εββα +++=Δ −− 1,1, ,    
               
with P and S denoting the price of the target bond and its corresponding common 
stock respectively. To enrich the extraction of information related to corporate bond 
price changes, I also consider the information provided by market movements: 
 
(2.15) it
i
t
mii
t
sii
t
biii
t MSPP εβββα ++++=Δ −−− 1,1,1, ,                  
                                                 
32 See Appendix B for a description of the extend Nelson-Siegel model and related estimation details. 
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with M representing the S&P 500 index level. Furthermore, as the price of 
corresponding default-free bonds contains information about risk-free rate changes, 
this variable is also added to the model, and hence the last specification for the AIM 
used in this study becomes: 
 
(2.16) it
i
t
sii
t
mii
t
dfii
t
biii
t SMDFPP εββββα +++++=Δ −−−− 1,1,1,1, , 
where DF stands for default-free bond. 
 
Data Description 
 
Compared to the abundant literature on the pricing of equity securities, research on 
the price behavior of corporate bonds is much sparser due to the lack of high quality 
bond data.33 Unlike stocks, the majority of corporate bond transactions take place on 
the OTC market34 and no price related information had been available to the public 
until NASD introduced the Fixed Income Pricing System (FIPS)35 in 1994, which was 
later incorporated into a broader system known as TRACE36 on July 1st, 2002. Under 
TRACE rules,37 all NASD members are obligated to submit transaction reports for any 
secondary market transaction in TRACE-eligible securities38 between 8:00PM and 
                                                 
33 The omission of research in this important market has been noted by Goodhart and O’Hara (1997) in 
an extensive review of the market microstructure literature.  
34 Some corporate bonds are also traded on the NYSE’s Automated Bond System (ABS).  But the 
trading volume is relatively low compared to that on the OTC market.  
35 For more information about FIPS, please see the NASD Notice to Members (NtM) 94-23, 
Alexander, Edwards, and Ferri (1999, 2000), and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002). 
36 Zhou (2005a) provides a brief review of recent developments in the corporate bond market, as well as 
a detailed description of the TRACE system. 
37 Also known as the NASD Rule 6200 series.  
38 According to NASD Rule 6210(a), TRACE-eligible securities ‘mean all United States dollar 
denominated debt securities that are depository eligible securities under Rule 11310(d); Investment 
Grade or Non-Investment Grade; issued by United States and/or foreign private issuers; and: (1) 
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 and purchased or sold pursuant to Rule 144A of the 
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6:30PM (EST) within one hour and fifteen minutes of the time of execution.39 Based 
on these submitted trading reports, NASD immediately distributes to the market 
transaction information on investment grade bonds with $1 billion or higher initial 
issuance, as well as a set of 50 most actively traded Non-Investment grade bonds 
(TRACE 50 thereafter). In the subsequent two and a half years, more and more 
corporate bonds have been designated for immediate dissemination, and beginning 
February 7th, 2005, NASD has begun to fully disseminate transaction information on 
virtually all corporate bonds in real-time. 
 
Since high-yield bonds incorporate an equity component and are more sensitive to 
firm-specific information than investment grade bonds, transaction data for the 
TRACE 50 bonds are used to study whether information is priced in corporate bonds. 
Based on the same data set, Zhou (2005a) finds that current corporate bond prices 
contain valuable information about future stock price movements, identifying an 
important informational role for the corporate bond market. The evidence of 
information-based trading in the corporate bond market provides encouragement for 
continued exploration of whether information risk is priced in the corporate bond 
market. 
 
Specifically, this data set contains execution date and time (recorded to the 
second), price, yield, quantity (and other information that can be used to purge invalid 
transaction reports) for every trade in the TRACE 50 high-yield bonds during the 
period from July 1st, 2002 to September 30th, 200440. The TRACE 50 bonds are 
                                                                                                                                            
Securities Act of 1933.’  It does not include debt securities issued by government-sponsored entities (GSE), 
mortgage-backed or asset-backed securities, collateralized mortgage obligations and money market instruments. 
39 The reporting time has been shortened to 15 minutes as of July 1st, 2005. 
40 On October 1st, 2004, NASD began its second stage dissemination, and many more high-yield bonds 
are subject to dissemination. The concept of TRACE 50 does not exist any more. 
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chosen by the NASD advisory committee based on criteria such as the security’s 
volume, price, name recognition, amount of research attracted, amount outstanding, 
number of dealers that are making a market in this security and the security’s 
contribution to the TRACE 50’s industry diversity. Similar to the FIPS 50 bonds 
studied by Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), the TRACE 50 bonds are characterized by 
high trading volume, both in terms of number of transactions and number of block size 
trades, and similar trading patterns to the issuer’s stock. Over time, bonds with small 
trading volume have been replaced with more active bonds. Transaction information 
on the first TRACE 50 bonds has been released to the market on a real-time basis 
since July 1st, 2002. From July 13th, 2003 until September 30th, 2004, the TRACE 50 
list was updated every 3 months. During this time period, 177 high-yield bonds from 
135 issuing firms were included in the TRACE 50 lists for dissemination. 
 
More frequent updating of the TRACE 50 lists since July 13th, 2003 makes it 
difficult to keep track of the time-series variation of liquidity and information 
asymmetry of any individual bond. To mitigate the effects introduced by discontinued 
dissemination for some bonds, I focus on the first TRACE 50 list which covers the 
period from July 1st, 2002 to July 13th, 2003, a total of 259 trading days. For each 
individual bond in this list, daily close price data are constructed by keeping the 
transaction price for the last valid trade before 6:30PM (EST), the time when TRACE 
is closed. Daily stock price data for the issuing firms is retrieved from CRSP for this 
time period. Since some firms are not public, and some are traded on the OTC market 
or the pink sheet market, corresponding stock price data does not exist for 7 of these 
bonds. Among the remaining 43 bonds, 8 are issued by firms with very inactive 
stocks, which do not have valid end of day bid-ask quotes or close prices for some of 
the trading days. By excluding these firms from my sample, I am left with a panel of 
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36 bonds across 259 trading days. 
 
Table 2.1 contains summary characteristics for the 36 corporate bonds and their 
issuing firms. Issuing firms are fairly large, with median total asset value of 8744 
million USD, and characterized by high financial leverage, which is consistent with 
the low credit ratings of these bonds. All 36 bonds in the sample are non-convertible, 
with 14 (38.89%) being callable prior to maturity. The bonds included in this study 
represent 6 different industries, concentrated in Manufacturing (30.56%), Service 
(30.56%) and Telecommunications (22.22%). More than half of the 36 bonds are 
senior unsecured notes. Coupon payments are made twice per year for each of the 36 
bonds, and all are fixed plain-vanilla coupons, except for one bond which has a 
variable coupon size. The average coupon rate is 8.848%. During the one year period 
studied by this paper, over 80% of the 36 TRACE 50 bonds were rated between CCC 
and BB by S&P and none of them defaulted. 
 
Table 2.1: Characteristics of 36 TRACE 50 Bonds and Their Issuing Firms 
 
Panel 1: 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
Issuer’s Total Assets  
($ millions) 
12642.4 8744 2265.9 36566 9364.9 
Leverage  
(Total Liabilities/Total Assets) 
0.8529 0.8667 0.5024 1.1835 0.1196 
Coupon Rate 8.8483 9.0625 6.0000 11.6250 1.2945 
Time to Maturity (year) 6.8998 6.6283 2.5435 26.7050 3.7830 
Panel 2: 
Bond Type SRDEB SRNT SRSECNT SRSUBNT SRUNNT UNNT 
Number of 
Bonds 
1 7 2 6 19 1 
Percentage 2.78 19.44 5.56 16.67 52.78 2.78 
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Table 2.1(Continued) 
Panel 3: 
S&P Rating BBB BB B CCC CC C NR 
Number of 
Bonds 
3 10 14 5 1 1 2 
Percentage 8.33 27.78 38.89 13.90 2.78 2.78 5.56 
Panel 4: 
Coupon Type Variable Plain Vanilla Fixed Coupon 
Number of Bonds 1 35 
Percentage 2.78 97.22 
Panel 5: 
Payment Frequency Semiannually 
Number of Bonds 36 
Percentage 100 
Panel 6: 
Industry ENGY FIN MANU SERV TELE TRANS 
Number of 
Bonds 
4 1 11 11 8 1 
Percentage 11.11 2.78 30.56 30.56 22.22 2.78 
Panel 7: 
Callable Yes No 
Number of Bonds 14 22 
Percentage 38.89 61.11 
Panel 8: 
Convertible Yes No 
Number of Bonds 0 36 
Percentage 0 100 
 
This table contains summary characteristics for the 36 corporate bonds and their 
issuing firms at the time of their initial entry to the TRACE 50 list.  Firm 
characteristics are based on data from COMPUSTAT, while bond characteristics are 
determined from the TRACE 50 dataset. Most of these descriptive bond data were 
obtained from NASD, with the remainder provided by the issuing firms. The following 
abbreviations are used in this table: for bond type, SRDEB (Senior Debenture), SRNT 
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(Senior Note), SRSECNT (Senior Secured Note), SRSUBNT (Senior Subordinated 
Note), SRUNNT (Senior Unsecured Note), and UNNT (Unsecured Note); for industry,  
ENGY (Energy), FIN (Financial), MANU (Manufacturing), SERV (Services), TELE 
(Telecommunications) and TRANS (Transportation). 
 
Finally, in order to measure the private information content of individual bonds, 
and calculate the yield spread of a corporate bond (which is defined as the difference 
between the corporate bond yield and the yield on a default-free bond with exactly the 
same maturity and coupon size), I first estimate the term structure of risk-free zero-
coupon interest rates. I use data on the most recently issued 3-month, 6-month US 
Treasury bills, 1-year Treasury note, as well as US Treasury bonds with maturities 
closest to 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 30 years from CRSP Daily US Treasury files. The 
extended Nelson-Siegel model [Bliss (1997)] is employed for estimation. 
 
Measuring liquidity and the Private Information Content of Individual 
Corporate Bonds 
 
Trading volume has been a widely cited measure for liquidity as more active 
markets tend to be more liquid [see for example, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 
(2000) and Hasbrouck (2003)]. Unfortunately, data for daily bond volume in each 
individual bond is not easy to construct from the TRACE 50 transaction dataset since 
the exact size of a trade is disseminated only for those trades whose par values do not 
exceed 1 million US dollars. For block size trades, only a sign of ‘1MM+’ is recorded. 
As an alternative, I use trading frequency, which is equal to the number of total valid 
transactions per day (NOT), as a proxy for liquidity. This measure is consistent with 
notion that liquid bonds tend to be traded more frequently. I also use the trading 
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impact on bond yields as a measure of illiquidity (ILLQ): 
 
(2.17)
tj
tjtj
tj volume
ysys
ILLQ
,
1,,
,
)log()log( −−= , 
 
where ys stands for yield spread.  
 
While liquidity is easy to measure from the data, estimating private information 
content involves applying the empirical models proposed in section I to time series 
data for each bond individually. Specifically, for each bond, I estimate the regressions 
for 3 different AIM specifications with a sample of 10 weeks, which represents 50 
observations. The resulting AIM represents the private information content of the 
bond during this period. The 10-week periods are then moved day by day, and 
regressions (2.14)-(2.16) are estimated accordingly. This allows us to rapidly capture 
changes in the information flow and determine bond specific AIM for every single day 
on the sample period. Therefore, AIM measures are available for each trading day in 
the sample period from September 11th, 2002 to July 11th, 2004 for each of the 35 
TRACE 50 bonds. Summary statistics for these AIM measures, as well as the liquidity 
measures NOT and ILLQ are provided in Table 2.2.  
 
Panel 1 presents some interesting results. First, compared to the stock market or 
the Treasury bond market, low grade corporate bonds are much less frequently traded, 
with a median trade number of 2 per day during the sample period. Secondly, the 
group of low grade corporate bonds studied in this paper contains significantly higher 
private information during the period from July 1st, 2002 to July 11th, 2003 than the 
6988 common stocks examined by Burlacu et al (2005) from January 1st, 1985 to 
December 31st, 2002. Information extracted from prices of the target corporate bond 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics for Liquidity Measure, the AIM measures and 
their Cross Correlations 
 
Panel 1 
 Mean Median Min 
First 
Quartile 
Third 
Quartile Max 
Standard 
Deviation
NOT 2.36 2 0 0 3 15 2.34 
ILLQ 6.732 3.129 0 2.046 7.118 38.214 5.396 
AIM1 0.215 0.196 0.000 0.117 0.304 0.855 0.127 
AIM2 0.255 0.242 0.002 0.093 0.350 0.875 0.127 
AIM3 0.291 0.288 0.003 0.192 0.382 0.876 0.125 
LOGAIM1 -1.778 -1.628 -9.114 -2.143 -1.190 -0.157 0.820 
LOGAIM2 -1.534 -1.418 -6.492 -1.843 -1.050 -0.133 0.659 
LOGAIM3 -1.348 -1.244 -5.936 -1.650 -0.962 -0.133 0.524 
Panel 2: 
 AIM1 AIM2 AIM3 
LOG- 
AIM1 
LOG- 
AIM2 
LOG- 
AIM3 NOT ILLQ 
AIM1 1.000 0.935 0.878 0.882 0.835 0.808 -0.029 0.109 
AIM2 0.935 1.000 0.935 0.834 0.911 0.874 -0.027 0.213 
AIM3 0.878 0.935 1.000 0.787 0.852 0.943 0.001 0.117 
LOGAIM
1 0.930 0.839 0.753 1.000 0.902 0.829 -0.041 0.121 
LOGAIM
2 0.882 0.834 0.787 0.902 1.000 0.910 -0.046 0.180 
LOGAIM
3 0.808 0.874 0.943 0.829 0.910 1.000 -0.020 0.229 
NOT -0.029 -0.027 0.001 -0.041 -0.046 -0.020 1.000 -0.189 
ILLQ 0.109 0.213 0.187 0.072 0.180 0.139 -0.189 1.000 
Panel 3: 
 AIM1 AIM2 AIM3 
LOGA
IM1 
LOGA
IM2 
LOGA
IM3 NOT ILLQ 
AIM1 1.000 0.900 0.816 0.930 0.848 0.789 -0.086 0.143 
AIM2 0.900 1.000 0.905 0.839 0.953 0.883 -0.085 0.193 
AIM3 0.816 0.905 1.000 0.753 0.855 0.969 -0.064 0.154 
LOGAI
M1 0.930 0.839 0.753 1.000 0.876 0.779 -0.089 1.120 
LOGAI
M2 0.848 0.953 0.855 0.876 1.000 0.889 -0.085 1.108 
LOGAI
M3 0.789 0.883 0.969 0.779 0.889 1.000 -0.071 0.149 
NOT -0.086 -0.085 -0.064 -0.089 -0.085 -0.071 1.000 -0.217 
ILLQ 0.143 0.193 0.154 0.120 0.108 0.149 -0.217 1.000 
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Panel 1 presents the mean, the median, the minimum, the maximum, the first quartile, 
the third quartile, and the standard deviation for the liquidity measures: number of 
transactions (NOT), and Amihud’s illiquidity measure (ILLQ), and the AIM measures. 
AIM1, AIM2 and AIM3 correspond to specifications (2.14)-(2.16) respectively. 
LOGAIM1, LOGAIM2 and LOGAIM3 are obtained by performing the transformation 
(2.13) on AIM1 through AIM3. Panel 2 and 3 contain cross-correlation coefficients 
between the liquidity measures and various AIM measures. Panel 2 has the 
coefficients based on the pooled data while Panel 3 includes the cross-sectional 
averages across the 35 bonds of correlations over time. 
 
and its issuer’s common stock reduces the uncertainty about future bond price 
movements of about 19.6%, compared to a maximum of about 7% from the different 
AIM specifications for common stocks by Burlacu et al (2005). Including the S&P 
500 index level as one of the information sources helps to further reduce the 
uncertainty by 4.6%, and the addition of the price of corresponding default-free bond 
makes it possible to explain 28.8% of future bond prices changes. Finally, the overall 
dispersion of my AIM measures for corporate bonds is much higher than that for 
common stocks, with an average standard deviation of about 12.7% for bonds, versus 
4% for stocks. The majority part of this variation can be explained by the fact that my 
AIM measures for corporate bonds display a high variability in time. The average 
time-series standard deviation is about 10.2%, with little deviation across different 
measures. This result differs from Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) who find that 
the estimated PIN is very stable across time. AIM measures in this paper thus raise the 
hope of keeping a closer track of the dynamics in information flow and capturing the 
changes in private information rapidly.  
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An interesting question is how these AIM measures are related to the liquidity 
measure, both across bonds and over time. According to market microstructure theory, 
liquidity is an inter-temporal concept which is not necessarily related to how 
information gets incorporated into prices.41 Empirical microstructure work, however, 
has shown that infrequently traded stocks are generally illiquid and have high private 
information content [see for example, Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996), 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001), Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) 
and Burlacu, Fontaine and Jimenez-Garces (2005)]. If actively traded stocks face a 
less severe adverse selection problem due to information-based trading, the negative 
correlation found in these studies should not be surprising. 
 
Panel 2 and 3 in Table 2.2 present the correlation coefficients between trade 
frequency and various AIM estimates for corporate bonds. Except for the correlation 
between NOT and AIM3, all of the correlations are highly significant and exhibit the 
anticipated signs. Trade frequency is negatively correlated with the degree of 
information asymmetry, with the correlation coefficient varying from -0.020 to -0.046. 
Illiquidity measure (ILLQ) is negatively correlated with NOT, and positively 
correlated with the AIM measures.  The magnitude of correlation for the set of low 
grade corporate bonds is smaller than that for common stocks found in other studies. 
For example, Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) find the average correlation 
between their PIN estimates and the logarithm of average daily trading volume is -
0.58, fluctuating between -0.38 and -0.71. Burlacu et al (2005) obtain a much smaller 
estimate of the correlation with a range of -0.04 to -0.10, which is still greater than 
                                                 
41 A strand of microstructure literature has been focused on the notion of liquidity. See for example, 
Demsetz (1968), Garman (1976), Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1981), Amidhud and Mendelson (1986, 
1988), O’Hara and Oldfield (1986), Grossman and Miller (1988), Biais (1993) and Madhavan and 
Smidt (1993). O’Hara (1995) provides an excellent textbook treatment of liquidity issues in 
microstructure theory.  For a clear illustration of the difference between liquidity and price discovery, 
see O’Hara (2003). 
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those for corporate bonds. Corporate bond trade frequency, however, displays a 
stronger correlation with AIM estimates over time.  Panel 3 shows that cross-sectional 
averages of correlations over time vary from -0.064 to -0.086. Finally, not 
surprisingly, different AIM measures for the bonds exhibit strong positive correlations 
with a minimum coefficient of 0.808. 
 
Information Asymmetry, Liquidity and Corporate Yield Spreads: Benchmark 
Results 
 
With the private information content and liquidity of individual bonds estimated 
above, this section takes the next step and studies whether these factors possess 
explanatory power for corporate yield spreads, in addition to those from the traditional 
corporate bond pricing models. During the sample period examined in this paper, the 
corporate bond market experienced a major increase in transparency when NASD 
started its Phase II implementation of public corporate bond transaction reporting 
through the TRACE system on March 3rd, 200342. The pool of corporate bonds which 
are subject to immediate dissemination was dramatically expanded from 500 to 4,200.  
The enhanced transparency of the corporate bond market could cause significant 
changes for the key variables studied in this paper, including informational efficiency, 
liquidity and yield spreads of the 35 TRACE 50 bonds. Therefore, I divide my sample 
into two parts, one before the end of February of 2003 (period I) and one after (period 
II). Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 depict how the main variables change over time, and 
summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 2.3. 
                                                 
42 The plan for Phase II dissemination of public corporate bond transaction reporting through NASD's Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) was approved by SEC and publicly announced on February 28th, 
2003.  See NASD News Release on February 28th, 2003. 
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Figure 2.1 Time-Varying Liquidity 
 
This figure plots the cross-sectional average of the daily time series of number of 
trades (NOT) for the 35 TRACE 50 corporate bonds.  The vertical dashed line refers 
to the day February 28th, 2003, when news about the SEC’s approval of NASD’s 
phase II implementation of public corporate bond transaction reporting through the 
TRACE system on March 3rd, 2003 became available to the market. During the Phase 
II dissemination, the pool of corporate bonds which are subject to immediate 
dissemination was dramatically expanded from 500 to 4,200. The data set consists of 
184 daily observations, from September 11th, 2002 to June 19th, 2003. 
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Figure 2.2 Time-Varying Corporate Yield Spreads 
 
This figure plots the cross-sectional average of the daily time series of Corporate 
Yield Spreads for the 35 TRACE 50 corporate bonds.  Yield spread is calculated as the 
difference between the corporate bond yield and the yield on a default-free bond with 
exactly the same maturity and coupon size. Yield on the corresponding default-free 
bond is estimated by employing a modified version of the extended Nelson-Siegel 
model [Bliss (1997)] on the observed on-the-run Treasury curve. The vertical dashed 
line refers to the day February 28th, 2003, when news about the SEC’s approval of 
NASD’s phase II implementation of public corporate bond transaction reporting 
through the TRACE system on March 3rd, 2003 became available to the market. 
During the Phase II dissemination, the pool of corporate bonds which are subject to 
immediate dissemination was dramatically expanded from 500 to 4,200. The data set 
consists of 184 daily observations, from September 11th, 2002 to June 19th, 2003. 
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Table 2.3: Sub-Sample Summary Statistics for Corporate Yield Spread, 
Liquidity and AIM Measures 
 
Panel 1: Mean and Time-Series Standard Deviations 
Period I Period II 
Variable Mean TS Std. Dev. Mean TS Std. Dev. 
YS 10.562 2.274 7.272 1.352 
NOT 1.681 1.315 4.090 2.197 
ILLQ 7.476 6.778 3.289 4.237 
LOGAIM1 -1.778 0.548 -1.834 0.574 
LOGAIM2 -1.525 0.414 -1.864 0.503 
LOGAIM3 -1.365 0.341 -1.388 0.395 
Panel 2: Time-Series Correlation with Yield Spreads 
 NOT ILLQ LOGAIM1 LOGAIM2 LOGAIM3 
YS 0.035 0.107 0.325 0.316 0.283 
 
This table reports summary statistics for YS (Yield Spread), NOT (Number of Trades), 
ILLQ (Amihud’s Illiquidity measure) and AIM measures (LOGAIM1, LOGAIM2 and 
LOGAIM3) for both period I (September 11th, 2002 to February 28th, 2003) and 
Period II (March 3rd, 2003-June 19th,2003). Yield spread is calculated as the 
difference between the corporate bond yield and the yield on a default-free bond with 
exactly the same maturity and coupon size. Yield on the corresponding default-free 
bond is estimated by employing a modified version of the extended Nelson-Siegel 
model [Bliss (1997)] on the observed on-the-run Treasury curve. AIM measures 
(LOGAIM1- LOGAIM3) are obtained by performing the transformation (2.13) on 
AIM1 through AIM3, which correspond to specifications (2.14)-(2.16) respectively.  
Statistics reported in Panel 1 includes the global mean of each variable (cross-
sectional average of the time-series averages), the cross-sectional average of time-
series standard deviation of each variable for both sub-samples. The correlations 
between yield spreads and the liquidity and AIM measures in time-series (averaged 
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across bonds) for period I is presented in Panel2. Non-significant correlations are 
italicized. 
 
First, as shown by Figure 2.1, trading activity levels for these bonds experienced a 
huge jump on February 28th, 2003 when news of the SEC’s approval of NASD’s phase 
II implementation of the TRACE system became available to the market, and 
remained high thereafter. According to Table 2.3, the average number of trades per 
day was 1.68 prior to March 3rd, 2003, but jumped to 4.09 afterwards. The finding that 
enhanced transparency in the corporate bond market increases liquidity in the already 
transparent TRACE 50 bonds may be due to traders becoming more aware of 
transparent prices. If transparency decreases transaction costs for those bonds made 
transparent on March 3rd and raises their liquidity, as found by Edwards, Harris and 
Piwowar (2005), the finding that TRACE 50 bonds also became more liquid might be 
due to some commonality in liquidity [see for example, Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001), 
and Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2003)]. 
 
Second, the degree of information asymmetry in the 35 TRACE 50 bonds has been 
lower since the Phase II dissemination. Panel 1 of Table 2.3 shows that the average 
AIM estimates for period II is lower than that for period I. This result is consistent 
with the experimental evidence provided by Bloomfield and O’Hara (1997) that trade 
disclosure improves informational efficiency. However, the enhanced transparency of 
the bond market brings to the market some new information resources, from which 
extra information about future bond price movements can be extracted. It thus raises 
the question of whether the AIM specifications proposed in Section 1 are still 
appropriate in measuring the private information content of corporate bonds. Not 
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surprisingly, the availability of additional information sources might subject my AIM 
measures to serious bias. This indicates that focusing on the period I sub-sample might 
be more appropriate. 
 
Finally, corporate yield spreads became narrow after March 3rd (Figure 2.2).  The 
average yield spread for the 35 bonds was 10.56% for period I.  This number, 
however, declined by almost a third to 7.27% for period II, suggesting that the lower 
degree of asymmetric information from trade disclosure reduces the information risks 
faced by uninformed traders, and hence less compensation is required for bearing such 
risks. Former studies on the corporate bond yield puzzle have relied on bond data 
when the market is not transparent, so, to allow for comparability with these studies, 
and due to the possibility that larger disclosure might introduce some bias into my 
AIM measures as suggested above, I will focus on the period I sub-sample in the rest 
of this paper. 
 
Informal Examination 
 
This subsection conducts an informal test of whether private information 
content and liquidity explain corporate yield spreads. Since investors require higher 
yields on bonds that are less liquid to compensate for the transaction cost incurred 
when trading the bonds, more liquid bonds should have lower yield spreads; i.e., there 
should exist a negative relation between yield spreads and liquidity measures. On the 
other hand, the degree of information asymmetry, estimated by various AIM 
measures, is expected to be positively correlated with corporate yield spreads. The 
reason behind this positive relationship lies in the fact that during the process of price 
discovery, some traders possess superior information about the value of bonds, and 
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hence might take advantage of this private information at the expense of uninformed 
traders. This type of informational advantage of informed traders creates a risk for 
uninformed traders as they constantly lose to informed ones. As a result, higher yields 
are required by bond holders for those bonds which possess more asymmetric 
information risk. 
 
Compared to the significant cross-sectional effect of liquidity on corporate 
yields documented in existing literature, its time-series effects on portfolio are much 
smaller, as shown by Figure 2.3 and Panel 2 of Table 2.3. The correlation between 
NOT and yield spread is not significant, either statistically and economically, and the 
correlation between ILLQ and yield spread is 0.107. The degree of information 
asymmetry, however, is strongly correlated with corporate yield spreads. The 
correlations between yield spreads and the AIM measures (LOGAIM1, LOGAIM2 
and LOGAIM3) are 0.325, 0.316 and 0.283, respectively, and they are all statistically 
significant and present the expected sign.  Furthermore, Figure 2.4 shows that the AIM 
measures move quite closely with yield spread changes over the sample period. This 
significant time-series link between information asymmetry and corporate yield 
spreads at the portfolio reveals a promising way to better explain corporate yield 
spreads observed in the markets. 
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Figure 2.3 Liquidity and Corporate Yield Spreads 
 
This figure plots the liquidity measure (NOT) alongside Corporate Yield Spreads for 
the 35 TRACE 50 corporate bonds during the period from September 11th to 
February 28th, 2003, one day before the NASD started its phase II implementation of 
public corporate bond transaction reporting through the TRACE system. The dotted 
line represents corporate yield spreads, which are plotted against the left vertical axis, 
while the solid line denotes the number of trades (NOT), which are plotted against the 
right vertical axis.  The data set consists of 107 daily observations. 
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Panel A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B 
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Panel C 
 
Figure 2.4 AIM measures and Corporate Yield Spreads 
 
The 3 figures above plot the cross-sectional average of daily time series of corporate 
yield spreads and the log transformation of the AIM measures for the 35 TRACE 50 
corporate bonds during the period from September 11th to February 28th, 2003, one 
day before the NASD started its phase II implementation of public corporate bond 
transaction reporting through the TRACE system. The dotted line represents 
corporate yield spreads, which are plotted against the left vertical axis, while the solid 
line denotes the AIM measures (logaim1-logaim3), which are plotted against the right 
vertical axis. AIM measures (logaim1- logaim3) are obtained by performing the 
transformation (2.13) on AIM1 through AIM3, which correspond to specifications 
(2.14)-(2.16) respectively. The data set consists of 107 daily observations. 
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Regression Analysis 
 
Following a brief examination of the correlations between corporate yield 
spreads and the AIM and liquidity measures, this subsection turns to benchmark 
regressions, which analyze the impact of private information and liquidity on 
corporate yield spreads. To explore how the time-variation in private information 
content and liquidity of corporate bonds affect  yield spreads on an individual basis, 
the following empirical models are estimated based on the panel data of 35 bonds 
across 107 trading days: 
 
(2.18) tititi AIMYS ,,10, εγγ ++= , 
 
(2.19) tititi NOTYS ,,20, εγγ ++= ,  
 
and 
 
(2.20) titititi NOTAIMYS ,,2,10, εγγγ +++= ,  
  
where tiYS ,  stands for the yield spread of bond i in day t, and ti,ε  is the mean-zero 
error term. All these regressions are pooled, imposing the same coefficients both over 
time and across different bonds. These models are estimated for three alternative AIM 
specifications (LOGAIM1, LOGAIM2 and LOGAIM3), and the estimation results are 
presented in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Benchmark Regressions with Alternative AIM Measures 
 
Panel 1: Private Information Content Measure by LOGAIM1 
REGRESSION 7 REGRESSION 9 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 12.938 12.25 13.036 12.30 11.376 11.98 
AIM 1.336 20.22 1.336 20.21 1.176 18.23 
NOT    -0.059 -1.7   
ILLQ      0.079 3.17 
R-Square 0.098   0.099   0.118   
Panel 2: Private Information Content Measured by LOGAIM2 
REGRESSION 7 REGRESSION 9 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 13.457 12.72 13.552 12.77 12.731 9.83 
AIM 1.898 21.3 1.897 21.29 1.367 15.85 
NOT    -0.058 -1.67   
ILLQ      0.103 2.77 
R-Square 0.108   0.109   0.123   
Panel 3: Private Information Content Measure by LOGAIM3 
REGRESSION 7 REGRESSION 9 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 13.179 12.48 13.257 12.51 11.78 10.75 
AIM 1.916 16.98 1.912 16.94 1.19 7.43 
NOT    -0.05 -1.41   
ILLQ      0.08 4.11 
R-Square 0.072   0.072   0.89   
Panel 4: Liquidity and Yield Spreads 
REGRESSION 8 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 10.669 10.21 8.765 7.34 
NOT -0.064 -1.73    
ILLQ   0.079 5.11 
R-Square 0.001   0.007   
 
This table reports the results from estimating regression (2.18)-(2.20) based on the 
panel data of 35 TRACE 50 bonds across 107 trading days. Results from estimating 
  93
regression (2.18) and (2.20) for three alternative AIM measures are presented in 
Panel 1, Panel 2 and Panel 3 respectively. Panel 4 contains results for regression 
(2.19). For each regression, I report the estimates of coefficients and their associated 
t-statistics and p-value, together with the resulting R-Square. The dependent variable, 
YS (yield spread), is calculated as the difference between the corporate bond yield and 
the yield on a default-free bond with exactly the same maturity and coupon size. Yield 
on the corresponding default-free bond is estimated by employing a modified version 
of the extended Nelson-Siegel model [Bliss (1997)] on the observed on-the-run 
Treasury curve. NOT and ILLQ stand for number of trades and Amihud’s illiquidity 
measure. AIM measures (LOGAIM1- LOGAIM3) are obtained by performing the 
transformation (2.13) on AIM1 through AIM3, which correspond to specifications 
(2.14)-(2.16) respectively. 
 
My primary interest lies in the estimates of 1λ  and 2λ , i.e., the coefficients for 
AIM and NOT (or ILLQ). My hypothesis concerning the liquidity effect is that since a 
decrease in the liquidity of a corporate bond (or equivalently an increase in the 
illiquidity) increases its transaction costs, and hence the required returns on this bond 
(the yield), a significant negative coefficient for NOT (or a significant positive 
coefficient for ILLQ) should be expected. As to the influence from information-based 
trading in corporate bonds, my hypothesis is that a higher degree of information 
asymmetry in a bond translates to a wider yield spread for that bond; therefore I expect 
significant positive coefficients for alternative AIM measures. 
 
Table 2.4 presents intriguing results. I find that liquidity (measured by NOT) 
has an expected negative effect on corporate yield spreads, consistent with previous 
studies which examine cross-sectional liquidity effects on corporate yield spreads. The 
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estimate of 2λ  in regression (2.19) is -0.064, and has a t-value of -1.73, marginally 
significant at the 10% level. To better understand the economic significance of the 
liquidity effect, it is helpful to go back to the summary statistics for NOT reported in 
Table 2.3. The cross-sectional average of time-series standard deviation of NOT is 
1.315, which means that a one-standard-deviation drop in liquidity leads to a widening 
of the yield spread by more than 8 basis points. Using ILLQ yields a more significant 
liquidity effects. A coefficient of 0.079 indicates that a one-standard-deviation drop in 
liquidity causes the yield spread to increase by more than 53 basis points. The finding 
that corporate yield spreads are subject to changes in the liquidity of corporate bonds 
indicates a liquidity component in the yield of corporate bonds. The R-Square of this 
regression, however, is fairly small (0.1% for NOT and 0.7% for ILLQ), suggesting 
that liquidity alone has limited explanatory power for yield spreads. 
 
Compared to the liquidity of individual bonds, private information content, 
estimated by alternative AIM measures, imposes much stronger effects on corporate 
yield spreads. The estimate of 1λ  in regression (2.18) is statistically significant at the 
1% level and presents the expected sign, regardless of which specification of the AIM 
measure is employed. The magnitude of the estimates is quite large.  Depending on 
which specification is used for the AIM measure, this number varies from 1.336 (for 
LOGAIM1) to 1.916 (for LOGAIM3). Together with the summary statistics for AIM 
measures in Table III, this suggests that a one-standard-deviation jump in the degree 
of information asymmetry of a corporate bond causes the bond’s yield spread to 
increase by 73 basis points, if LOGAIM1 is used as a proxy for asymmetric 
information. For the other AIM measures, LOGAIM2 and LOGAIM3, this number 
becomes 78 and 65 respectively. The R-square value of regression (2.18) is much 
larger than that of regression (2.19) where the liquidity measure is used as the 
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repressor.  For example, when the first AIM measure (LOGAIM1) is used in 
regression (2.18), the R-square is 0.098, meaning that information alone explains 
about 10% of the corporate yield spreads. R-square values for regression (2.19) using 
LOGAIM2 and LOGAIM3 are 0.108 and 0.072 respectively. Furthermore, the strong 
information effects persist even when the liquidity measure is added into the model 
[see the results of regression (2.20)]. The estimate of 1λ  is still statistically significant 
at the 1% level and remains positive. Several recent studies on information risk as a 
determinant of stock returns [for example, Easley et al (2002) find that a difference of 
10 percentage points in PIN between two stocks leads to a difference of 2.5 percent 
annual return;  Burlacu et al (2005) argue that their AIM measure has a strong impact 
on stock returns and dominates traditional factors of risk such as β  and the Fama and 
French factors]. In line with this, the results of this paper present striking evidence that 
information is an important factor in determining the corporate yield spread, and the 
risk of information-based trading is also priced in the yield of corporate bonds. 
 
Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
To check the robustness of the benchmark results, I consider in this section several 
extensions of the original model. First, I exclude from the sample those bonds which 
have special features that would subject their value to information-based trading. After 
that, I add to the model several factors from corporate bond pricing literature that have 
been shown to have some explanatory power for corporate yield spreads. 
 
Embedded Options 
 
High-yield corporate bonds typically have special features, such as embedded 
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options, that would result in their being priced differently. If options are attractive to 
traders with superior information about the issuer’s assets, as extensively supported 
[see for example, Black (1975),  Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas (1998); For an overview 
of the literature on informed trading in the options markets, see Zhou (2005a)], the 
high sensitivity of a bond’s yield spread to the degree of information asymmetry 
identified in section 4 might simply be reflective of the relation between the bond’s 
embedded options and the information-based trading. To get rid of this potential bias, 
all bonds with embedded call or put options or sinking fund provisions, and bonds 
with floating-rate coupon payments were eliminated. Since all TRACE 50 bonds are 
nonconvertible, no bonds were excluded for that reason, leaving a panel of 21 bonds 
across 107 trading days. 
 
Table 2.5 presents strong evidence of the liquidity and information effects on 
corporate yield spreads. Compared to the benchmark regression results when all 36 
TRACE 50 bonds are included (provided in Table IV), the coefficient for liquidity 
(measured by NOT) in regression (8) continues to be negative, but its significance 
level increases, both statistically and economically. The t-statistics for 2λ  in regression 
(8) changes from -1.73 to -2.02, bringing the significance to a level lower than 5%. 
The estimate for 2λ  (when NOT is used as a measure for liquidity) is now -0.1, 
indicating that a one-standard-deviation fall in liquidity leads to a jump of the yield 
spread by more than 13 basis points (it is a 57 basis point if ILLQ is used to measure 
liquidity). Even though the explanatory power of liquidity remains small, with an R-
square of 0.2% for regression (8), it is higher than when bonds with special features 
were included in the sample. 
 
 
  97
Table 2.5: Benchmark Regressions with Alternative AIM Measures on bonds 
without special features 
 
Panel 1: Private Information Content Measure by LOGAIM1 
REGRESSION 7 REGRESSION 9 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 12.975 9.13 13.134 9.21 9.881 10.54 
AIM 1.596 17.74 1.595 17.74 1.497 15.67 
NOT    -0.096 -2.08   
ILLQ      0.087 1.91 
R-Square 0.123   0.125   0.139   
Panel 2: Private Information Content Measured by LOGAIM2 
REGRESSION 7 REGRESSION 9 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 13.338 9.39 13.461 9.44 14.234 10.39 
AIM 2.1 17.83 2.095 17.78 1.589 16.05 
NOT    -0.079 -1.7   
ILLQ      0.074 3.13 
R-Square 0.124   0.125   0.147   
Panel 3: Private Information Content Measure by LOGAIM3 
REGRESSION 7 REGRESSION 9 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 13.24 9.33 13.328 9.35 10.239 8.53 
AIM 2.271 15.09 2.26 15.19 1.963 11.75 
NOT    -0.062 -1.31   
ILLQ      0.077 3.21 
R-Square 0.092   0.093   0.121   
Panel 4: Liquidity and Yield Spreads 
REGRESSION 8 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 10.456 7.48 9.142 8.37 
NOT -0.1 -2.02    
ILLQ   0.085 4.17 
R-Square 0.002   0.083   
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This table reports the results from estimating regression (2.18)-(2.20) based on the 
panel data of 21 TRACE 50 bonds across 107 trading days. These 21 bonds have 
constant semiannual coupon payments, and no embedded options (convertible, 
callable or sinking fund provisions). Results from estimating regression (2.18) and 
(2.20) for three alternative AIM measures are presented in Panel 1, Panel 2 and Panel 
3 respectively. Panel 4 contains results for regression (2.19). For each regression, I 
report the estimates of coefficients and their associated t-statistics and p-value, 
together with the resulting R-Square. The dependent variable, YS (yield spread), is 
calculated as the difference between the corporate bond yield and the yield on a 
default-free bond with exactly the same maturity and coupon size. Yield on the 
corresponding default-free bond is estimated by employing a modified version of the 
extended Nelson-Siegel model [Bliss (1997)] on the observed on-the-run Treasury 
curve. NOT stands for number of trades, which is used as a measure for liquidity in 
this paper. AIM measures (LOGAIM1- LOGAIM3) are obtained by performing the 
transformation (2.13) on AIM1 through AIM3, which correspond to specifications 
(2.14)-(2.16) respectively. 
 
 
What is more surprising, however, is that information effects remain strong, 
and even become slightly stronger when bonds with embedded options are eliminated. 
Re-estimation of regression (2.19) shows that the coefficients for the AIM measures 
increase and are still significant at the 1% level, no matter which specification is used. 
The estimates of the coefficients for LOGAIM1, LOGAIM2 and LOGAIM3 in 
regression (2.19) move from 1.336, 1.898 and 1.916 to 1.596, 2.1 and 2.271 
respectively. This implies that if the degree of information asymmetry of a corporate 
bond (measured by LOGAIM1) goes up by one-standard-deviation, the yield spread of 
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this bond will rise 87 basis points43. Furthermore, the explanatory power of the 
information factor increases. The R-square becomes 12.3%, 12.4% and 9.2% for the 
regression (2.18) with AIM specified by LOGAIM1, LOGAIM2 and LOGAIM3 
correspondingly. Finally, even after accounting for liquidity differences, the private 
information content of a corporate bond continues to be a significant factor 
influencing corporate bond yield spreads (see Table 2.5). 
 
Traditional Factors Affecting Corporate Yield Spreads 
 
Within traditional corporate bond pricing literature, several factors have 
already been identified as determinants of corporate yield spreads. To make the 
argument that information and liquidity provide additional explanatory power for yield 
spreads, it is important to test whether these microstructure factors are simply proxies 
for traditional yield spread determinants. Therefore, the regression model in equation 
(2.20) is expanded to include the following independent variables: 
 
Credit Ratings.  Previous studies have shown that credit ratings44 of corporate 
bonds affect their yield spreads [see for example, Campbell and Taksler (2003) and 
Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2004)]. Since this study focuses on a 
relatively small number of high-yield corporate bonds, I aggregate the different ratings 
by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) into 3 groups: Rating Group 1 includes bonds rated no 
lower than BB- by S&P. Rating Group 2 consists of the B level bonds, and all the 
                                                 
43 It is 86 and 77 basis points for LOGAIM2 and LOGAIM3, respectively. 
44 The credit rating of a corporate bond is not a perfect measure for credit risk, as several studies have 
shown that there is a lag between changes in credit risks and credit rating migrations [see for example, 
Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2004)]. Since this paper is not focusing on modeling the 
dynamics of credit risks, I follow Campbell and Taksler (2003) by using credit rating as a control for 
bond credit risks. 
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other bonds which are rated no higher than CCC+ are left in Rating Group 3.  
 
Level and slope of the Term Structure of Treasury Rate.  Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) argue in their model that an increase in risk-free interest rates implies 
an upward drift in the risk-neutral process for the value of the firm, (which means that 
firm value drifts away for the financial distress threshold at a faster rate as the interest 
rate rises), and hence a reduction in the risk-neutral probability of default and 
corporate yield spread. The negative relation between the risk-free interest rate and 
corporate yield spreads predicted by the model was empirically supported in their 
paper. Following Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) and Cremers, 
Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2004), among others, I use the 10-year Treasury 
rate to describe the level of the term structure. I also include the squared level of the 
10-year Treasury rate, as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), to capture 
potential nonlinear effects due to convexity. Even though all of these studies also 
calculate the difference between the 10- and 2- year Treasury rates to describe the 
slope of the term structure, and use it to measure the expectation of future short rates 
and overall economic health, empirical evidence of its effect on yield spreads is rather 
limited [see for example Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) and Campbell 
and Taksler (2003)]. Therefore, I only use the daily series of 10-year Treasury rates 
from the CRSP Daily Fixed Term Indices File. 
 
Implied Volatilities of Individual Options.  In a recent paper, Cremers, 
Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2004) show that option implied volatilities 
contain important information for corporate yield spreads. To test whether my AIM 
measures are simply picking up volatility risk, implied volatilities of the options for 
those firms that have their bonds included in my sample were added. If the AIM 
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measures are correlated with implied volatilities of individual options, the coefficients 
on AIM measures should shrink to zero when a direct proxy for volatility risk is added 
to the model. Following Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2004), for each 
individual bond, I retrieve from OptionMetrics, LLC the daily data on the implied 
volatility of at-the-money put options on the issuer’s common stock. 
 
Liquidity of Issuer’s Options.  If firm-specific credit risk in a corporate bond 
can be somewhat hedged by trading in individual options of its issuer, the liquidity of 
the market for these options may have an influence on the bond’s yield spread. When 
the liquidity for the issuer’s options dries up, hedging the corporate bond becomes 
difficult and costly. A higher yield spread thus will be required to compensate for that 
cost. This hypothesis is empirically supported by Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and 
Weinbaum (2004). They find some evidence that individual options do have liquidity-
spillover effects on the corporate bonds. Furthermore, if the liquidity of a corporate 
bond is correlated with the liquidity of the issuer’s traded options, the significance of 
the liquidity measure for corporate bonds in the benchmark regression might simply 
reflect the liquidity-spillover effects mentioned above. 
 
Lagged Stock Returns.  Leading effects of stocks on corporate bonds have been 
documented in several studies [see for example, Kwan (1996), Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein and Martin (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003) and Zhou (2005a)]. 
Therefore, I also include the one-day lagged S&P 500 return as a regressor. 
 
By including all these additional variables, the benchmark regression is expanded as 
follows: 
(2.21) 
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where RGTWO and RGTHREE denote the dummy variables for Rating Group two 
and Rating Group three; TENYR stands for the ten-year interest rate;  OPTVOL and 
OPTLIQ represent the implied-volatility and liquidity of the at-the-money put option 
by the issuer, and SP symbolizes the S&P 500 return.  Results from estimating this 
model are presented in Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6: Regressions with Traditional Corporate Yield Spreads Determinants 
 
Panel 1 Private Information Content Measure by LOGAIM1 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 12.808 3.6 11.793 4.21 
AIM 1.311 14.32 1.19 11.28 
NOT -0.1 -2.26   
ILLQ   0.078 3.77 
RGTWO 8.435 3.19 7.142 2.98 
RGTHREE 10.558 2.41 11.649 1.98 
TENYR -1.756 -2.28 -1.926 -3.19 
OPTVOL 2.997 10.33 2.756 9.43 
OPTLIQ -0.928 -2.64 -0.879 -2.76 
SP 9.417 1.21 8.39 1.13 
R-Square 15.40%   16.87%   
Panel 2 Private Information Content Measure by LOGAIM2 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 14.271 4.12 15.219 3.18 
AIM 1.801 15.48 1.593 11.85 
NOT -0.089 -2.03   
ILLQ   0.067 3.16 
RGTWO 8.526 3.19 7.924 3.19 
RGTHREE 10.804 2.44 11.017 3.05 
TENYR -2.024 -2.74 -2.731 -3.16 
OPTVOL 2.879 9.95 2.817 8.43 
OPTLIQ -0.916 -2.62 -0.105 -2.73 
SP 10.077 1.35 8.93 1.15 
R-Square 16.70%   17.72%   
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Panel 3 Private Information Content Measure by LOGAIM3 
  Est. t-stat Est. t-stat 
Constant 13.884 3.86 11.759 4.01 
AIM 1.918 12.59 1.497 10.73 
NOT -0.072 -1.61   
ILLQ   0.083 2.97 
RGTWO 8.357 3.16 8.156 2.98 
RGTHREE 10.765 2.45 11.01 2.78 
TENYR -1.903 -2.43 -1.876 -2.13 
OPTVOL 2.845 9.65 2.759 8.75 
OPTLIQ -1.336 -3.76 -1.537 -2.78 
SP 11.053 1.4 9.136 0.87 
R-Square 13.70%   15.01%   
 
This table reports the results from estimating regression (2.21) based on the panel 
data of 21 TRACE 50 bonds across 107 trading days. These 21 bonds have constant 
semiannual coupon payments, and no embedded options (convertible, callable or 
sinking fund provisions). Results for three alternative AIM measures are presented in 
Panel 1, Panel 2 and Panel 3 respectively. For descriptions about the yield spread 
(YS), AIM measures (AIM) and liquidity measures (NOT and ILLQ), see Table VIII. 
RGTWO and RGTHREE denotes the dummy variables for credit group two and credit 
group three respectively. TENYR stands for the ten-year interest rate. OPTVOL and 
OPTLIQ represent the implied-volatility and liquidity for the at-the-money put option 
for the issuer, and SP symbolizes the S&P return. 
 
It is intriguing to observe that liquidity and AIM measures for individual 
corporate bonds continue to play important roles in determining corporate yield 
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spreads. Coefficients for both liquidity and information asymmetry remain statistically 
significant and present the expected signs. Furthermore, these factors prove to be 
economically meaningful in explaining yield spreads. The coefficient of -0.1 for NOT 
(0.078 for ILLQ) implies that a one-standard-deviation shock to the liquidity of a 
corporate bond moves its yield spread by more than 13 basis points (52 basis points), 
when the first specification of the AIM measure is used in the regression. This impact 
(from NOT) changes slightly when different AIM measures are employed [about 11 
basis points and 9 basis points for the second and the third AIM measures 
respectively]. Compared to the liquidity effect, information-based trading has a larger 
influence on the corporate yield spread. For the AIM measure specified by equation 
(2.14), the coefficient of 1.311 indicates that a one-standard deviation increase in the 
degree of information asymmetry of a corporate bond is associated with a widening of 
the bond’s yield spread by 71 basis points. The change in the yield spread becomes 74 
and 65 basis points when specification 2 and specification 3 are chosen for the AIM 
measure. The extreme robustness of these results supports my hypothesis that 
information-based trading risks, as well as the transaction costs of liquidity, assume 
important roles in explaining corporate yield spreads. Valuation of risky corporate 
debt needs to be recast to incorporate these market microstructure factors, which have 
long been ignored in the literature. 
 
To finish up the robustness check of my results, it is necessary to examine the 
traditional corporate bond pricing factors. Consistent with earlier work, coefficients 
for all of these extra variables are statistically significant and carry the expected signs, 
except for the S&P 500 market return. This result, however, is not that surprising, as 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) also find that this coefficient is not 
significant and presents the wrong sign for higher leverage (lower rated) bonds, which 
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are the focus of this study. Turning to other factors, the credit rating of a corporate 
bond continues to bring economically meaningful differences in yield spreads. Lower 
rated bonds tend to have higher yield spreads. The level of risk-free interest rates, 
measured by the 10-year treasury rate, has a significant negative effect on yield 
spreads, in line with the argument made by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). Finally, 
the options market contains valuable information in explaining corporate yield 
spreads. Implied volatilities of at-the-money put options on the issuer’s common stock 
are shown to be useful proxies for volatility risk, which directly affect the yield spread 
of the issuer’s debt securities, reinforcing the findings by Cremers, Driessen, 
Maenhout and Weinbaum (2004). The liquidity of a firm’s traded options has 
significant negative effects on the yield spread of its bond, again confirming the 
liquidity spill-over effects documented by Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and 
Weinbaum (2004). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Taking advantage of a recently available corporate bond transaction dataset from 
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), as well as a new measure for 
the degree of information asymmetry derived from a multi-security rational 
expectations model, I have demonstrated in this paper that market microstructure 
factors, including information and liquidity, possess additional explanatory power in 
explaining the actual yield spreads of risky corporate bonds. A one-standard-deviation 
drop in liquidity (measured by NOT) leads to a widening of the yield spread by more 
than 13 basis points (by 52 basis points when ILLQ is used), and a one-standard-
deviation jump in the degree of information asymmetry of a corporate bond causes the 
bond’s yield spread to increase by 71 basis points, after controlling for the effects from 
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traditional corporate bond pricing models. Liquidity (measured by trade frequency) 
and information (measured by AIM) alone explain about 10% of the corporate yield 
spreads. This paper extends the recent literature on the implications of market 
microstructure for asset pricing [initiated by Easley and O’Hara (2004)] to the 
corporate bond market, and suggests that yields of corporate debt might embed both 
an information premium and a liquidity premium that are ignored by existing 
corporate bond pricing models. Therefore, valuation of corporate debt needs to be 
recast in broader terms to integrate the transaction costs of liquidity and risks from 
information asymmetry during the process of price discovery. 
 
Furthermore, this paper also suggests that the information structure surrounding a 
firm’s debt has important effects on its financing and risk management decisions. If 
there is enormous information-based trading in a firm’s risky bonds, investors will 
require higher yields to hold these bonds, and hence the firm will be less willing to 
issue bonds in equilibrium. This study, consistent with Easley and O’Hara (2004), 
implies that a firm can affect its cost of debt by choosing analyst coverage, disclosure 
policy, market microstructure, accounting treatments and any other factors that will 
influence the information structure surrounding its debt securities. It provides a new 
perspective to understand the complete market assumption in the Modigliani and 
Miller Theorem. 
 
Finally, recent research has started to look beyond the traditional bond pricing 
framework for better explanations of the credit spread puzzle. Odders-White and 
Ready (2004) show that microstructure measures of adverse selection in the equity 
securities are larger when credit ratings of the issuer’s bonds are poor. Yu (2005) finds 
that firms with higher accounting transparency tend to have lower credit spreads. The 
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main contribution of this paper is that I establish a significant link between corporate 
yield spreads and two main market microstructure factors: information and liquidity. 
Whether these factors completely solve the yield spread puzzle in the finance literature 
is not addressed in this paper, but constitutes a very interesting and important topic for 
further research. This topic in turn, requires an estimation of the information risk 
premium and liquidity premium, as well as a theoretical corporate bond pricing model 
which explicitly incorporates the information risk and liquidity costs. Research in this 
direction is currently under way. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Estimation Default-Free Zero-Coupon Interest Rates by Using the Extend 
Nelson-Siegel Model 
 
The extended Nelson-Siegel Model fits an exponential approximation of the discount 
rate function directly to observed bond prices. In this model, the bond pricing function 
is simply ∑
=
−= i
M
m
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where c and m refer to the cash flow and its related time respectively. The discount 
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In this model, d  denotes the Macaulay duration and iε  is the pricing error. With the 
estimates ]ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ[ˆ 21210 ττβββ=Φ , the discount rate r(m), the default-free zero-coupon 
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interest rate, and thereafter the price and the yield of the corresponding default-free 
bonds can be readily calculated.  
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